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ABSTRACT 
 Institutions of higher education have underdeveloped emergency management 
programs despite academic research, industry surveys, and guidance from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Education. This research set out 
to discover what recurring issues are commonly identified in higher education emergency 
management programs. These issues tended to fall into three broad categories: resources, 
planning, and engagement. An exploratory case study was then conducted on Oregon’s 
Campus Resilience Consortium to see how this proposed model could address repetitive 
issues. The research found that Oregon’s program is poised to strengthen continuity, 
communication, and collaboration among institutions across the state. Implementation 
concerns were identified. 
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Institutions of higher education (IHEs) are key members of their communities and 
are considered partners in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s “whole 
community” concept.1 In times of disaster, IHEs often provide shelter, assistance, and 
resources to their communities. Because disasters begin and end locally, campuses must 
be prepared and resilient in order to recover quickly and ensure their education mission 
continues. Enhancing campus preparedness, response, and recovery in catastrophes could 
improve the overall resiliency of the jurisdictions in which IHEs reside. However, 
emergency preparedness and management programs in higher education are still under-
developed despite the vast amount of research, surveys, and planning documents provided 
to them by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Education. 
Incident after incident, common issues arise in IHE preparedness.  
This research set out to discover what recurring issues scholars commonly identify 
in higher education emergency management programs. A literature review showed that 
recurring issues tend to fall into three broad categories: resources, planning, and 
engagement.2 More specifically:  
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Response Framework, third edition 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 6, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf; 
FEMA, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for 
Action, FDOC 104–008-1 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 4, www.fema.gov/ 
media-library/assets/documents/23781; Elaine Pittman, “Remember: All Disasters Are Local, Says FEMA 
Deputy Administrator,” Emergency Management, November 14, 2011, http://www.govtech.com/em/ 
disaster/Remember-All-Disasters-Are-Local-Says-FEMA-Deputy-Administrator.html. 
2 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “National Higher Education Emergency Management 
Program Needs Assessment” (report, National Center for Campus Public Safety, 2016), ii–viii, 
http://www.nccpsafety.org/news/articles/national-higher-education-emergency-management-needs-
assessment; Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of the National Campus Safety and Security 
Project Survey” (report, Campus Safety & Security Project, 2007), 29–33, https://theoxfordconclave.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CSSPSurveyResults.pdf; Dennis K. Sullivan, “2011 Higher Education 
Emergency Management Survey,” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety 19, no. 4 (July 2012): 36–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2011.10.001; Margolis Healy Solutions for Safe Campuses, Margolis Healy 
Campus Safety Survey (Burlington, VT: Margolis Healy Solutions for Safe Campuses, 2015), 
http://www.margolishealy.com/files/resources/2015MargolisHealy_CampusSafetySurvey_1.pdf. 
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• lack of resources to support emergency management programs—such as 
emergency management staffing, mutual aid agreements, and budget dollars;  
• incomplete plans for emergency management assessment, response, and 
recovery (e.g., emergency operation plans, adequate hazard and vulnerability 
analysis, continuity planning); and 
• absence of engagement from all levels within the institution, most notably in 
upper management.3  
Many surveys, assessments, and studies have looked at the emergency preparedness 
of higher education institutions; however, year after year, few changes are seen improving 
the areas of planning, engagement, and resources. IHE emergency management programs 
and roles within those programs are ill-defined and, regardless of the national climate and 
policy guidance, there has been little progressive change in the academic community 
regarding campus preparedness and resiliency. What these compounding studies and 
surveys indicate is that having a plan completed does not ensure the campus is prepared to 
respond. There are a number of interdependencies in play when discussing planning, 
engagement, and resources. Often, lack of staffing in emergency management is blamed 
on budget constraints; poor planning or infrequent training and exercises could themselves 
be due to lack of staff, and campus community engagement could be blamed on not having 
enough training and exercises. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to influence one area without 
affecting others.  
In addition to these recurring issues, the average budget trend of IHEs is declining, 
which means less funding for emergency management activities.4 Universities and 
colleges have to strategically look toward the future. With ever-changing technology, rising 
disaster frequency, and the possibility of continued budget cuts, academic institutions need 
                                                 
3 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Needs Assessment,” ii–vii; Campus Safety & Security 
Project, “Results of Survey,” 29–33; Sullivan, “2011 Higher Education Emergency Management Survey”; 
Margolis Healy, Campus Safety Survey. 
4 Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman, and Kathleen Materson, “A Lost Decade in Higher Education 
Funding,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, August 23, 2017, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-
budget-and-tax/a-lost-decade-in-higher-education-funding. 
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to ensure preparedness goals are achieved before something happens. These issues are not 
new to the higher education community, nor have they been solved by the smorgasbord of 
federal guidance documents; new solutions are needed. 
This research reviews the Oregon Campus Resilience Consortium’s plan to 
improve emergency management programming and resiliency in IHEs across the state. In 
doing so, it also evaluates how the consortium’s plan might address the recurring 
emergency management issues (planning, engagement, and resources) found in the 
literature.  Ultimately, the research showed that the Oregon model could provide positive 
solutions in a number of areas. The continuity, communication, and collaboration between 
universities and colleges across the state through shared services, all-hazards incident 
management teams (IMTs), statewide training, and online resource-sharing will provide 
uniformity in planning, training, and response. The all-hazards IMT will also align with 
the state IMT, opening the lines of communication and seamlessly tying IHEs into a state 
response. Frequent communication with the governor’s office, legislature, and campus 
presidents can bring visibility and accountability for emergency management in IHEs, and 
can eliminate unknowns for the state’s leadership. Finally, collaboration through the 
National Intercollegiate Mutual Aid Agreement with IHEs nationwide can provide 
additional stakeholders and support for the Oregon system. Once the Oregon model has 
been implemented, this case study can be used as a baseline for tracking what changes and 
gaps the Oregon model fills and could inform other states about how something similar 
may or may not work in their own region.  
Emergency managers have more to do than plan and respond for disaster; they need 
to think strategically about the future of higher education and emergency management 
needs as the world rapidly changes. Past case studies and lessons learned have offered 
historical narratives and helped IHEs understand why decisions were made and what, at 
that point in time, was lacking or needed. However, IHEs must look strategically at their 
preparedness programs and determine how they will be funded, supported, and continued 
as the requirements of homeland security become harder to meet and the funds for higher 
education decrease. Imagining a future in emergency management where everything is 
connected, planning is understood, and response is seamless provides a hopeful vision for 
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what IHE programs could look like. IHEs must determine what works well and what does 
not so future emergency management programs can flourish. Oregon will be a model to 
watch and, as the program unfolds, states can take what works from Oregon and implement 
it in their own jurisdictions, leaving behind whatever portions of the Oregon model are not 
effective. Building programs off proven tactics will lead to a more robust IHE system and 
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Disasters begin and end locally.1 Emergency management practitioners, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) commonly reference this declaration when proclaiming that the “whole 
community” is important for national resiliency and homeland security.2 FEMA’s whole 
community concept stresses that each individual, group, and community can engage in 
emergency management practices, increasing their understanding of local risks, needs, and 
capabilities and emerging a more resilient community.3 FEMA recognizes that the 
government-centric approach will not meet future challenges posed by crises and, as a 
nation, we must invest in our communities with social capital in order to prepare for and 
recover from disasters at the local level.4  
Institutions of higher education (IHEs) are key members within their communities 
and are considered partners in the whole community concept. In times of disaster, IHEs 
often provide shelter, assistance, and resources to their communities. Likewise, campuses 
may rely on their jurisdictions for support if a crisis occurs locally. Enhancing campus 
preparedness, response, and recovery in catastrophes could improve the overall resiliency 
of the jurisdictions in which the colleges or universities reside. However, emergency 
preparedness and management programs in higher education are still under-developed and 
behind the curve despite the vast amount of research, surveys, and planning documents 
provided to them by FEMA, DHS, and the Department of Education. Incident after 
incident, common issues arise in IHE preparedness on campuses despite the accessibility 
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Response Framework, third edition 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 6, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf; 
Elaine Pittman, “Remember: All Disasters Are Local, Says FEMA Deputy Administrator,” Emergency 
Management, November 14, 2011, 1, http://www.govtech.com/em/disaster/Remember-All-Disasters-Are-
Local-Says-FEMA-Deputy-Administrator.html. 
2 FEMA, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and 
Pathways for Action, FDOC 104–008-1 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 2, 
www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/23781 
3 FEMA, 4. 
4 FEMA, 2. 
 2 
of a number of federal guidance documents, demonstrating that this availability does not 
equate to prepared campuses. Since disasters begin and end locally, campuses must be 
prepared and resilient in order to recover quickly and ensure their education mission 
continues. There are some innovative preparedness programs that universities and colleges 
have instituted; nonetheless, with the availability of planning guidance to campuses, overall 
improvement in IHE preparedness programs should be evident; the same issues should not 
keep bubbling to the top.  
This thesis explores what the higher education system in Oregon is implementing 
in order to make progressive change in the state’s IHEs. The universities and colleges are 
looking beyond their own campus boundaries and exploring how they, both public and 
private postsecondary institutions, can work together to build their preparedness system to 
increase resiliency. This exploratory case study focuses on past higher education 
emergency preparedness studies, unpacking the recurring—yet unresolved—issues that 
have been identified year after year; it then analyzes if the proposed Oregon model could 
offer a solution for the repeated gaps that are commonly identified.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Disaster preparedness and response programs in higher education settings are 
emphasized in homeland security doctrine and various higher education–specific training 
and guidance.5 Nevertheless, IHEs remain unprepared to respond to and manage disasters, 
and confusion within planning and emergency management programs exists.6 One well-
known preparedness example is the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (Virginia Tech). Though plans were complete and the university was 
prepared for certain types of disasters, a retroactive deep dive into Virginia Tech’s policy 
and procedures after the ambuscade shooting tragedy they endured when Seung-Hui Cho 
                                                 
5 FEMA, Building a Disaster-Resistant University, FEMA 443 (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2003), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/2288; U.S. Department 
of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, Action Guide for Emergency Management at 
Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, DC: Department of Education, 2009), https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=38626; “Ready Campus,” FEMA, accessed May 14, 2017, https://www.ready.gov/campus. 
6 Ahmad Jaradat, Hajdar Mziu, and Jamaludin Ibrahim, “Disaster Preparedness in Universities,” 
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology 19, no. 1 (2015).  
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killed thirty-two students and faculty members showed a number of preparedness and 
response areas where the school was lacking.7 The response of the institution to this highly 
publicized incident was scrutinized by various media outlets as legal proceedings lasted 
years.8 Virginia Tech, a leading IHE in a number of fields, is still remembered for this 
tragedy and is used as an example of lessons learned, as gaps and publicized findings 
pointed out their planning and response failures.9 Though any number of campuses could 
have had similar findings after a crisis such as this, many of the identified lessons learned 
from Virginia Tech have never been addressed at other institutions and can still be found 
regularly in any IHE after action report. One example is the University of Iowa: After 
recent campus shootings, the university conducted an internal audit and found its 
preparedness procedures lacking, despite all of the published lessons learned.10 Inadequate 
crisis communication was one audit finding, a key issue that emerged from Virginia Tech 
years earlier. The University of Iowa did not “learn” from other university incidents, or 
even its own—a 1991 shooting on the Iowa campus that left six dead.11  
Campus shootings are not isolated incidents, and an active shooter is not the only 
threat for which IHEs have to be prepared. Though these huge-hitting, catastrophic 
headlines lead the news, campuses have day-to-day incidents that can severely impact 
business and cause economic challenges. FEMA’s Building a Disaster-Resistant 
University guide conveys that over the past decade, man-made and natural disasters have 
been increasing at a disturbing frequency for IHEs, at times causing death and injury and 
                                                 
7 “Virginia Tech, We Remember,” Virginia Tech, accessed July 10, 2017, http://weremember.vt.edu/ 
content/weremember_vt_edu/en/index.html. 
8 Ian Urbina, “Virginia Tech Criticized for Actions in Shooting,” New York Times, August 30, 2007, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/us/30school.html. 
9 Virginia Tech Review Panel, “Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech: Report of the Review Panel” 
(report, Virginia Tech, 2007); Gordon K. Davis, “Connecting the Dots: Lessons from the Virginia Tech 
Shootings,” Change 40, no. 1 (February 2008): 8–15; Urbina, “Virginia Tech Criticized.” 
10 Elianna Novitch, “Audit Reveals Discrepancies in UI Emergency Preparedness,” Daily Iowan, 
March 9, 2018, http://daily-iowan.com/2018/03/09/audit-reveals-discrepancies-in-ui-emergency-
preparedness/. 
11 Mike Klien, “Nov. 1, 1991: The Day a University Shooting Rampage Shocked Iowa,” Des Moines 
Register, November 1, 2016, https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2016/10/28/nov-1-1991-day-
university-shooting-rampage-shocked-iowa/92053548/. 
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always imposing economic challenges on academic institutions as they recover.12 
Instances such as campus closures after Hurricane Katrina, universities affected by 
tornados demolishing towns, and water main breaks causing flooding and business 
interruption are a few examples of incidents that can highly impact—and have highly 
impacted—IHEs.13  
Despite the continued guidance from federal agencies and the frequency of 
incidents in the IHE community with publicly shared lessons learned, many studies show 
that IHEs are not prepared to respond to man-made and natural disasters.14 David Farris 
and Robert McCreight, two homeland security professionals who studied the 
professionalism of emergency management in IHEs, found that emergency planning for 
campuses lacks continuity, and confusion exists throughout the institutions about how 
emergency programs are organized and maintained.15 Numerous surveys conducted at 
colleges and universities in regards to emergency management support Farris’s and 
McCreight’s conclusion. In a number of studies between 2008 and 2016, there were 
common trends discovered in the analysis:  
• lack of resources to support emergency management programs, including 
emergency management staffing, mutual aid agreements, and budget dollars;  
• incomplete plans for emergency management assessment, response, and 
recovery (e.g., emergency operation plans, adequate hazard and vulnerability 
analysis, continuity planning); and 
                                                 
12 FEMA, Building a Disaster-Resistant University, iii. 
13 Mary C. Comerio, “The Economic Benefits of a Disaster Resistant University: Earthquake Loss 
Estimation for UC Berkeley” (working paper, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 2000), 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/78g7j8jq; Lars Anderson, “SI Vault: Terror, Tragedy and Hope in 
Tuscaloosa,” Sports Illustrated, April 24, 2015, https://www.si.com/college-football/2015/04/24/si-vault-
tuscaloosa-tornado-alabama-crimson-tide-athletes; “Timeline of the 1997 Flood,” University of North 
Dakota Chester Fritz Library, accessed January 6, 2018, https://library.und.edu/digital/flood-calls/ 
timeline.php. 
14 FEMA, Building a Disaster-Resistant University; U.S. Department of Education, Action Guide; 
FEMA, “Ready Campus”; Jaradat, Mziu, and Ibrahim, “Disaster Preparedness in Universities,” 1–4. 
15 David Farris and Robert McCreight, “The Professionalization of Emergency Management in 
Institutions of Higher Education,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 11, no. 1 
(January 2014): 86, https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2013-0074. 
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• absence of engagement from all levels within the institution, most notably in 
upper management.16  
An additional challenge is that, overall, the average budget trend of IHEs is 
declining, which means there is less funding for emergency management activities. 
Figure 1, from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, shows an average decrease in 
state funding for IHEs.17 Although in recent years funds appear to move upward, state 
funding remains well below pre-recession levels. This is important because IHEs tend to 
have increasing annual costs as new technology requires up-to-date equipment, buildings, 
and research space, which comes with prevention costs (e.g., cybersecurity) to combat 
continually emerging threats.  
                                                 
16 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “National Higher Education Emergency Management 
Program Needs Assessment” (report, National Center for Campus Public Safety, 2016), ii–viii, 
http://www.nccpsafety.org/news/articles/national-higher-education-emergency-management-needs-
assessment; Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of the National Campus Safety and Security 
Project Survey” (report, Campus Safety & Security Project, 2007), 29–33, https://theoxfordconclave.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CSSPSurveyResults.pdf; Dennis K. Sullivan, “2011 Higher Education 
Emergency Management Survey,” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety 19, no. 4 (July 2012): 36–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2011.10.001; Margolis Healy Solutions for Safe Campuses, Margolis Healy 
Campus Safety Survey (Burlington, VT: Margolis Healy Solutions for Safe Campuses, 2015), 
http://www.margolishealy.com/files/resources/2015MargolisHealy_CampusSafetySurvey_1.pdf. 
17 Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman, and Kathleen Materson, “A Lost Decade in Higher 




Figure 1.  Average Decrease in State Spending on Higher Education18 
These issues are not new to the higher education community, nor have they been 
solved by the smorgasbord of federal guidance documents. Understanding of emergency 
management in IHEs, roles of emergency management staff at institutions, measurements 
of effectiveness, and progressive solutions still evade most campus practitioners. Despite 
the numerous studies that have been completed, higher education still spins its wheels. To 
begin to move toward a resilient and prepared system, it is important to make change; even 
if that change fails, it is progress in the right direction. Not all policy changes will work, 
and not all can be implemented at once due to cost, personnel, or other wicked problems. 
However, it is important to identify higher education leaders who are working toward a 
solution.  
With the findings from recent after action reports and from its own disasters in the 
past few years, one state is making changes with its postsecondary institutions by 
                                                 
18 Source: Mitchell, Leachman, and Materson. 
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leveraging its network of campuses as a consortium with a shared mission.19 The 
University of Oregon is leading the charge with the intent to make campuses in the state 
safer and more resilient. Through building a networked system of IHEs and maximizing 
resources with a shared services model, Oregon is looking to build sustainable and resilient 
academic facilities across the state.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are a number of questions that could be garnered from the problem space. 
Why do these repetitive issues continue? Why do we lack the motivation to improve these 
issues? How do these programs define success or resiliency? This research focuses strictly 
on outlining the recurring challenges and analyzes Oregon’s proposed plan to see if this 
model could address unresolved gaps. Two main questions arose based on this exploratory 
research: 
• What are the overarching recurring issues in higher education emergency 
management programs? 
• How does the Oregon Campus Resilience Consortium model address 
recurring higher education emergency management issues? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines past studies and assessments of emergency 
management programs within the IHE community and how program effectiveness is 
commonly measured for any jurisdiction type. A comparison of studies and assessments 
over time reveals that similar concerns within the academic communities are identified 
year after year. Existing work tends to focus on three areas—planning, engagement, and 
resources—as either a way to measure programmatic success, or as an identification of 
areas that need further development. The following sections explore how emergency 
management programs are typically measured, showing that the common use of checklists 
                                                 
19 University of Oregon, “Oregon Campus Resilience Consortium” (draft concept paper, University of 
Oregon, 2017,) https://safety.uoregon.edu/sites/safety1.uoregon.edu/files/oregon_crc_conceptpaper_0425 
17_draft.pdf. 
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or frameworks has not led to massive improvements, and conducts a deeper dive into the 
categories of planning, engagement, and resources.   
1. Frameworks and Measurements 
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it” is a saying attributed to Peter 
Drucker, an Austrian-born American management consultant, author, and educator.20 In 
order to achieve what you have set out to do, you must have a way to show progress. If not, 
how can you know that you have reached your goal? Amy Donahue and Philip Joyce 
describe emergency management as a complex system and conclude their research with 
one difficult but important question: “Is it feasible to measure the performance of 
emergency management activities?”21 According to Drucker, it is a necessity. However, 
no one knows how to precisely measure emergency management; there is no model or 
proven methodology.  
Though there are many accepted frameworks for the planning process in any 
jurisdiction—some even provide checklist-type documents in an attempt to show metrics—
they do not include in-depth guidance for how to evaluate effectiveness of the planning 
efforts. The frameworks do not offer any assessment measures to determine whether or not 
the IHE, or any jurisdiction using the documents, is actually prepared. Daniel Henstra, as 
one example, provides a framework for what he identified as “elements” that, if in place, 
offer best practices for program evaluation, performance, and measurement for local 
emergency management programs.22 The author’s view of what should be included in an 
effective emergency management program limits this type of framework. Henstra provides 
a checklist of low-, medium-, and high-quality “program elements” that he argues are 
necessary for an effective emergency management program. These elements are separated 
                                                 
20 Matthew Cornell, “If You Can’t Measure It, You Can’t Manage It.— Peter Drucker?,” Matthew 
Cornell (blog), July 30, 2007, http://www.matthewcornell.org/blog/2007/7/30/whats-your-feed-reading-
speed.html#1. 
21 Amy K. Donahue and Philip G. Joyce, “A Framework for Analyzing Emergency Management with 
an Application to Federal Budgeting,” Public Administration Review 61, no. 6 (2001): 738, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3110007. 
22 Daniel Henstra, “Evaluating Local Government Emergency Management Programs: What 
Framework Should Public Managers Adopt?,” Public Administration Review 70, no. 2 (2010): 236–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02130.x. 
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into preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery and include items such as personnel 
(i.e., dedicated emergency managers), plans (e.g., response, mitigation, and special needs 
plans), and mutual aid.23 Each element is scored on its completion and assessment of 
quality. For example, an emergency management committee with senior officials is higher 
quality than one with lower officials, according to Henstra. Having these elements in place 
is a good checklist for an emergency management program, but the list is not fully 
comprehensive; it is based on the assessor’s definition of high, medium, and low quality, 
and it is not effective for all jurisdictional levels of emergency management programs (e.g., 
from state to county to city emergency management programs). Additionally, having these 
items in place does not ensure preparedness.   
Completed plans sit at the top of Henstra’s framework, as well as many other 
proposed checklists and frameworks, as a measurement tool for effective programs. 
Similarly, in the campus setting, past studies also note that plan completion is a key 
measurement tool in IHE emergency management program effectiveness. Plans are 
oftentimes said to be the most critical element of an emergency management program in 
any jurisdiction and can include response, continuity, and recovery plans. However, 
measuring completion of a plan and equating the measurement to preparedness may not be 
enough. 
2. Planning 
Though some would consider emergency management, specifically in higher 
education, an emerging field, a number of notable studies on campus crises have been 
conducted. Each study and assessment focused initially on an emergency plan for the 
institution—after all, FEMA and researchers assert that planning is the most important step 
in any crisis response. FEMA articulates planning as a critical tool for any organization to 
mitigate the risk during the initial response, and as a foundational element to response.24 
                                                 
23 Henstra, 242. 
24 FEMA, FEMA Incident Management and Support Keystone (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/26688; John C. 
Cavanaugh, “Effectively Managing Major Disasters,” The Psychologist-Manager Journal 9, no. 1 (2006): 
5, http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15503461tpmj0901_2. 
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Eugene Zdziarski and J. Michael Rollo describe it as the “single most important crisis 
management tool a campus can have.”25 A number of frameworks also list “planning” as 
a key measurement or element needed for an effective program, but a deeper dive into past 
studies and assessments demonstrates that completed plans do not equate to prepared 
institutions.  
Zdziarski’s 2001 study of student affairs administrators concluded that well-
prepared IHEs create and maintain written crisis management plans, develop contingency 
plans to address unique issues presented by different types of crises, and address the pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases in their planning.26 The majority of the institutions he 
surveyed perceived themselves as prepared and had plans to back up their perceptions, with 
approximately 88 percent of the surveyed group having some kind of written plan.27 Linda 
Catullo, who built on Zdziarski’s study with published documents after 9/11, did not find 
significant changes within the student affairs administrators despite the vast changes in 
crisis response management, such as the adoption of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).28 Her study showed a slight increase, with 94 percent of institutions 
having a written plan. The same year that Catullo published her study, the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) conducted an all-
hazards survey of emergency management professionals, with 342 IHEs responding out of 
2,203 surveyed.29 Similar to the findings of Catullo and Zdziarski, this assessment 
determined that a high number (85 percent) of campuses had what they considered an all-
hazards emergency preparedness plan.  
                                                 
25 Eugene L. Zdziarski and J. Michael Rollo, “Developing a Crisis Management Plan,” in Campus 
Crisis Management: A Comprehensive Guide to Planning, Prevention, Response, and Recovery, 1st edition 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), 74. 
26 Eugene L. Zdziarski, “Institutional Preparedness to Respond to Campus Crises as Perceived by 
Student Affairs Administrators in Selected NASPA Institutions” (PhD diss., Texas A&M University, 
2001), 109. 
27 Zdziarski, 103. 
28 Linda A. Catullo, “Post-September 11, 2001 through Pre-Virginia Tech Massacre, April 16, 2007: 
The Status of Crisis Management Preparedness as Perceived by University Student Affairs Administrators 
in Selected NASPA Member Institutions” (PhD diss., Florida Atlantic University, 2008), 61–76. 
29 Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of Project Survey,” 9. 
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If having a plan of some sort were enough to ensure preparedness, these numbers 
would be outstanding, and measurements of program effectiveness based on plans would 
be easily quantifiable. However, as studies continued, the checkmark of having a plan was 
not enough. Mary Lott researched perceived preparedness at five universities within a 
consortium of Washington, DC, institutions in 2012.30 She assessed perceived 
preparedness of all campus community members including administrators, staff, students 
and faculty, whereas past researchers focused on one portion, such as student affairs. Lott 
discovered most administrators and crisis management team members believed their 
organization was prepared; however, faculty, students, and staff did not share this 
perception, communicating that they were not familiar with crisis policy or their role in 
response. If respondents, both those who perceived preparedness and those who did not, 
happened to know about the plans, they did not know how often the plans were updated 
and were unsure how often the crisis management team met, suggesting an awareness gap.  
An assessment three years later by Margolis Healy for a variety of campus 
community members resulted in 513 respondents who agreed upon the criticality of 
emergency management programs on campuses.31 In alignment with past research and 
assessments, those surveyed had a high rate of developed emergency operations plans 
(EOPs), with roughly 86 percent stating their institution had a developed EOP. But when 
asked about comprehensive hazard and vulnerability assessments, only 54.7 percent stated 
they had conducted one. Not completing a hazard and vulnerability assessment could mean 
that EOPs were incomplete and not based on hazards specific to the campus. This key 
finding was not isolated; a 2016 National Center for Campus Public Safety (NCCPS) 
survey observed comparable results.32 Approximately 611 IHEs responded, with either 
full or partial responses finding that EOP numbers were high while risk assessment (or 
hazard and vulnerability assessment) numbers were relatively low. The data detailed in 
Table 1 outline responses in terms of plan completion throughout the surveyed IHEs. The 
                                                 
30 Mary Keane Lott, “Crisis Management Plans in Higher Education: Commonalities, Attributes, and 
Perceived Effectiveness” (PhD diss., Gallaudet University, 2012). 
31 Margolis Healy, Campus Safety Survey, 1–4. 
32 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs Assessment,” 2, 22–25. 
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gap between EOPs being complete and risk assessments conducted spans close to 20 
percent, which could mean that some EOPs are not complete. These discoveries raise 
additional questions about what key pieces must be in a plan to make it complete, though 
many guidance documents, studies, and assessments note that knowing what risks your 
institution faces is a key piece of plan development.  
Table 1.   NCCPS Survey Planning Results33 
 
 
Maureen Connolly proclaims that even if plans are technically done and a crisis 
team is theoretically in place, it does not necessarily mean that a campus is prepared.34 
Connolly posits that every administrator, staff member, and faculty member needs to 
understand his or her role in a crisis event for true preparedness, though it extends beyond 
that to students as well. Paradoxically, Megumi Kano et al. showed that 74 percent of staff 
and students did not know what was expected of them during a crisis response.35 Though 
studies show that the campus community assumes it is prepared, when asked what to 
                                                 
33 Source: National Center for Campus Public Safety, 22. 
34 Maureen Connolly, Campus Emergency Preparedness: Meeting ICS and NIMS Compliance, 1st 
edition (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 3–4, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781466587618. 
35 Megumi Kano et al., “Are Schools Prepared for Emergencies? A Baseline Assessment of 
Emergency Preparedness at School Sites in Three Los Angeles County School Districts,” Education and 
Urban Society 39, no. 3 (May 2007): 399–422, https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124506298130. 
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actually do in an emergency event or where to find the campus’s plan, campus personnel 
(e.g., staff, faculty, administrators) are unable to answer those questions.  
Despite the high number of IHEs with claims of completed plans, research shows 
a lack of complete planning—and planning understanding—at the institutional level.36 The 
Margolis Healy study, which showed a high, 86-percent rate of plans developed from those 
surveyed, noted that institutions lacked a comprehensive hazard and vulnerability 
assessment, which is critical to drafting an effective plan.37 When researchers went one 
step further and analyzed critical parts of the plans, they proved that IHEs may be 
publishing an EOP, but an incomplete one. Even when crisis response team members are 
sure their institution is prepared, other campus community members, such as students or 
faculty, cannot answer key preparedness questions.38 In relation to incomplete plans, Ian 
Mitroff, Michael Diamond, and Murat Alpaslan found that when IHEs have a written and 
published crisis plan, it rarely addresses situations uncommon to the university or college, 
only addressing “traditional” scenarios such as, fires, lawsuits, and crimes, according to a 
group of provost respondents.39 These scenarios (fires, lawsuits, and crimes) are quite 
different than what other groups would itemize; for example, emergency managers would 
not claim that lawsuits and crimes are traditional scenarios they prepare for or respond to. 
This raises two issues, one being inconsistencies in what constitutes a crisis within a 
university or college, and the second being the limited scenarios IHEs plan for and their 
tendency to focus their efforts on the most frequent occurrences. IHE leaders who have 
undergone disasters recommend to plan for events worse than imagined scenarios, which 
is uncommon for institutions to do.40 
                                                 
36 Jia Wang and Holly M. Hutchins, “Crisis Management in Higher Education: What Have We 
Learned from Virginia Tech?,” Advances in Developing Human Resources 12, no. 5 (October 2010): 553, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1523422310394433. 
37 Margolis Healy, Campus Safety Survey, 1. 
38 Lott, “Crisis Management Plans,” iv. 
39 Ian I. Mitroff, Michael A. Diamond, and C. Murat Alpaslan, “How Prepared Are America’s 
Colleges and Universities for Major Crises? Assessing the State of Crisis Management,” Change: The 
Magazine of Higher Learning 38, no. 1 (2006): 60–67, https://doi.org/10.3200/CHNG.38.1.61-67. 
40 Cavanaugh, “Effectively Managing Major Disasters,” 2. 
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The type of academic institution also makes a difference in planning. In Dong-chul 
Seo et al.’s study of IHE disaster response, which included eighty-eight private and 
seventy-three public IHEs of diverse locations, sizes, and ethnic backgrounds, small 
schools (those with fewer than 3,000 students) were less likely to have suitable plans to 
respond to crisis situations, provide training to employees, and have students who 
understand emergency procedures.41 Large institutions also had program challenges; of 
the 161 IHEs studied, 19 percent openly admitted to having no plans to drill campus-wide 
emergencies, with 29 percent of those being large campuses with more than 10,000 
students.42 On the contrary, Covington claims that small IHEs are generally prepared for 
crisis situations, evidenced by written response plans, contingency plans, and involvement 
of necessary internal and external stakeholders.43 These differences point to the limitations 
of surveyed research and assessments. Some issues with surveyed findings include small 
sample sizes of survey takers, different questions across the surveys (which gives varying 
findings), and survey respondents’ biases as to how their respective IHE prepares or does 
not prepare for a crisis. Synthesis of this survey data can still be useful, but does not show 
how to measure or conclude that emergency management programs are effective. 
The literature described in this section tends to stress a “written plan,” yet it is 
difficult to assess if the written plan is actually complete, effectively disseminated, and 
well-understood throughout the campus, or if it is something that has been sitting on the 
shelf for five years.44 As Brian Jackson powerfully asks in his research, “How certain 
should we as a nation be that the systems we have put in place to respond to damaging 
events will be able to deliver when called upon?”45 Undoubtedly, a plan is an important 
                                                 
41 Dong-chul Seo et al., “Campus Violence Preparedness of U.S. College Campuses,” Security 
Journal 25, no. 3 (July 2012): 202–208, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1057/sj.2011.18. 
42 Dong-chul et al., 208. 
43 Philip D. Covington, “Institutional Crisis Readiness as Perceived by Small College and University 
Senior Student Affairs Officers at NASPA Member Institutions” (PhD diss., The University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, 2013), 135. 
44 Brian A. Jackson, The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing 
“Response Reliability” as Part of Homeland Security Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP234.html. 
45 Jackson, vii. 
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initial step, but it is just one cog in the machine. Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan noted that 
IHEs only prepare for the crises they have already experienced, suggesting a very reactive 
approach, and postulated that campuses lack the broad-based programs needed for effective 
response.46 Planning for a single or isolated event instead of the interactions that occur 
when disaster does strike could leave institutions unprepared; for example, the Penn State 
sexual abuse scandal was not a single Clery finding, but a series of interrelated political, 
leadership, and abuse crises concluding in a string of firings and resignations, and millions 
of dollars in fines.47 Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan believe that planning for a broader 
range of crisis types and ensuring that the crisis management team is well trained and 
includes a number of internal and external stakeholders in the planning process would leave 
IHEs more prepared, as crises are just systems of other crises.48 If it is not the plan that 
entirely makes the difference but rather the team and its training, examining engagement 
in planning would be beneficial. John Cavanaugh states that success is unlikely to be met 
through use of a disaster plan, claiming the most important element in disaster response is 
engaged leaders.49 Cavanaugh argues that leaders will just assume that someone within the 
organization will handle the crisis and that they—the leaders—do not need to deal with the 
planning or the response.  
3. Engagement 
Mutual aid and involvement of both internal and external stakeholders are often 
defined as key elements of planning within higher education. Zdziarski notes that 
appropriate internal and external stakeholders need to be a part of an established and well-
trained crisis management team for effective response.50 But, again, a number of studies 
and assessments concluded that although IHEs identify stakeholders, stakeholders remain 
                                                 
46 Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan, “How Prepared,” 62–66. 
47 Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan, 62; “Penn State Scandal Fast Facts,” CNN, March 28, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/us/penn-state-scandal-fast-facts/index.html; “Clery” is shorthand for the 
Jeanne Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statics Act, which is discussed further in 
Chapter II. 
48 Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan, “How Prepared,” 62.  
49 Cavanaugh, “Effectively Managing Major Disasters,” 4–5. 
50 Zdziarski, “Institutional Preparedness,” 34–39. 
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inconsistent from institution to institution. This inconsistency is expected, as different 
types of IHEs may need different stakeholders; however, studies show that stakeholders 
are not always included in the training and planning, which leads to ineffective programs.51  
The NACUBO survey identified that preparedness is a priority for the surveyed 
IHEs, but also noted that respondents claimed leadership was disengaged.52 It is 
challenging to assert that preparedness is a priority if leadership is disinterested. As 
Cavanaugh notes, if leaders believe that someone else within the organization will handle 
the crisis for them, then how can a college or university believe it is prepared?53 Over half 
of the IHEs in the NCCPS survey agreed they had committed leadership at their institution, 
and that in the past five years the level of emergency management at their IHE had 
increased.54 What “increased” means was not documented or measured. However, poor 
institutional engagement, specifically at the leadership level, was also a top finding in the 
NCCPS survey; 40 percent believed the institution did not have appropriate “buy-in.” This 
question only asked about leadership, leaving out important thoughts about engagement 
levels from the remainder of campus. As Lott discussed, a number of staff and students 
believed they were prepared, but when asked probing questions about how they would 
respond or where to find the plan, they were not able to answer.55 This could mean that the 
campus communities and internal stakeholders are not engaged enough to seek out those 
answers or that emergency management planners have not effectively engaged them.  
The NACUBO survey additionally noted differences between larger and smaller 
institutions, finding that smaller institutions (which they define as institutions with fewer 
                                                 
51 Covington, “Institutional Crisis Readiness,” 134; Covington concluded that more internal than 
external stakeholders were involved, with the greatest external stakeholders being fire, police, local 
emergency management, and local hospitals.  
Catullo, “Status of Crisis Management Preparedness,” 82; a large number of external stakeholders 
unfamiliar with campus emergency procedures. 
Zdziarski, “Institutional Preparedness,” 107. 
52 Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of Survey,” 30. 
53 Cavanaugh, “Effectively Managing Major Disasters,” 4. 
54 National Center for Campus Public Safety, Program Needs Assessment, 15–17. 
55 Lott, “Crisis Management Plans in Higher Education,” 102. 
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than 4,000 students) lack presidential participation and dedicated emergency managers.56 
Lack of mutual aid agreements was also demonstrated, which could be considered as lack 
of external stakeholder involvement and engagement.57 However, a number of other 
studies show that small institutions actually have more external stakeholder engagement 
through mutually beneficial relationships between the community and the campus.58 In 
times of crisis, the college or university relies on the city or county in the same way that 
the external community relies on the college or university for help in disaster response. 
Despite this external stakeholder engagement, Christopher Akers found smaller institutions 
to be less prepared due to complacency issues and lack of resources.59 Conversely, 
Zdziarski noted that large institutions, those with enrollment of 30,000 or more, actually 
appeared to be less prepared to respond to campus crisis even though their perception of 
response preparation was much higher.60 Neither Akers nor Zdziarski connected response 
effectiveness to stakeholder involvement. Catullo found no increase in the amount of 
involvement that external stakeholders played, though it should be noted that her survey 
mimicked Zdziarski’s study, conducted six years later following 9/11—an event that 
transformed emergency preparedness policy.61  
Engaging the internal campus community in emergency management planning is 
difficult with the complex IHE landscape. Rollo and Zdziarski claim that one of the most 
difficult aspects is the constant turnover of team personnel, which inhibits effective 
planning and training.62 Campus personnel (people) are the number one resource; as a 
practitioner, you need to be able to access that resource. The plan’s list of appropriate 
people is the key resource for use during crisis response. If these individuals cannot be 
contacted, then the response will be hampered. Campus stakeholders must know who can 
                                                 
56 Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of Survey,” 30. 
57 Campus Safety & Security Project, 32. 
58 Christopher Ryan Akers, “Evolution of Emergency Operations Strategies: Structure and Process of 
Crisis Response in College Student Affairs” (PhD diss., University of Georgia, 2007), 160. 
59 Akers, 160. 
60 Zdziarski, “Institutional Preparedness,” 112. 
61 Catullo, “Status of Crisis Management Preparedness,” 81. 
62 Zdziarski and Rollo, “Developing a Crisis Management Plan,” 76. 
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be counted on, who is adequately trained, where they can be contacted, who the key 
decision makers are, and which additional internal stakeholders must be given updates or 
final reports. NACUBO concluded that universities and colleges have strained resources 
and budgets, and if internal personnel are not available, networking with local agencies 
through mutual aid agreements could help alleviate this challenge.63  
4. Resources 
Resources potentially include a number of items, but the most commonly cited in 
the literature as a necessity for higher education emergency preparedness are staffing and 
funding.64 Figure 2 shows the issues respondents identified as “critical needs” in the 
NCCPS survey. The NCCPS survey respondents noted budget as their top need, though 
not as their only vulnerability.65 Staffing levels and planning efforts that focus more on 
continuity and recovery than response were also considered necessary.  
                                                 
63 Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of Survey,” 32. 
64 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs Assessment,” 19; Campus Safety & 
Security Project, “Results of Survey,” 32. 
65 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs Assessment,” 31–33. 
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Figure 2.  Critical Needs Assessment Survey Findings66 
It could be argued that budget is the reason for lack of staffing in emergency 
management. As noted previously, a number of smaller institutions do not have dedicated 
emergency managers; but even with full-time staff, emergency managers are often required 
to do a number of other things.67 The Margolis Healy survey noted that institutions lack 
emergency management professionals and that additional duties are often added to the 
workload of those also managing that program.68 Additionally, NACUBO offered 




                                                 
66 Source: National Center for Campus Public Safety, 19. 
67 Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 61. 
68 Margolis Healy, Campus Safety Survey, 2. 
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managers by not adding additional duties to their workload and ensuring the president is 
actively involved in policy group planning, addressing both the staffing and 
engagement issue.69 
Looking again at IHE types, the literature points out differences. Akers found that 
urban institutions have more resources and external partnerships, yet in a crisis situation 
they must also expect immediate media engagement, which could hinder their response.70 
While rural IHEs actually have greater control and access of their campuses in times of 
crisis, despite fewer resources available, the community itself often depends on these 
campuses for help and resources. However, these arguments are already changing as media 
are ever-present at all IHE types through smartphones and social media. What the literature 
does not point out is definitive resource needs. As outlined in the beginning of this section, 
resources can encompass a large majority of personnel, equipment, and monetary elements 
within the emergency management program.  
5. Summary 
Despite the high numbers of IHEs with completed plans, ample research shows a 
lack of planning at the institutional level. Though many studies showed a high percentage 
of IHEs with developed plans, institutions lacked comprehensive hazard and vulnerability 
assessments and institutional understanding, which are critical to implementing effective 
plans. What these compounding studies and surveys indicate is that having a plan 
completed or not does not ensure the campus is prepared to respond. Just because a campus 
has a plan that outlines types of crises, phases in which they prepare, and stakeholders, it 
does not necessarily mean that the first responders of that university or college, which may 
include non-administrators, are prepared to respond.  
Preparedness surveys on various institutional emergency management programs 
demonstrate that emergency management programs in higher education lack resources, 
planning, and engagement. Surveys are useful and offer consistent findings if conducted 
                                                 
69 Campus Safety & Security Project, “Results of Survey,” 32. 
70 Akers, “Evolution of Emergency Operations Strategies,” 164–67. 
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year after year in the same manner on the same populations, but there are limitations to 
using surveys; for instance, they are specific to an individual community or jurisdiction, 
the questions from survey to survey differ greatly, and there are biases or perceptions 
germane to the people who respond to the survey. The surveys conducted averaged a 
response rate of approximately 10 percent of the total IHEs across the United States. If 
these surveys are representative of all IHEs, they demonstrate that resources, planning, and 
engagement at academic institutions are capability gaps that campus leadership should 
address. Closing these gaps would lead to progressive change in campus emergency 
management programs, which would further push IHEs toward more efficient response and 
greater resiliency.  
While it is apparent that many surveys, assessments, and studies have looked at the 
preparedness of higher education, these studies were measured through checklist-type 
frameworks that equated elements like “completed plans” or “full-time personnel” to 
institutional preparedness. Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy demonstrate that in incident 
after incident, no matter the jurisdiction, the same problems are uncovered in the crisis 
response after action reports.71 Though this study focused on lessons learned in crisis 
management overall, the higher education trend follows suit: year after year, few changes 
are seen with planning, engagement, and resources. Measurements remain elusive, IHE 
emergency management programs and roles within those programs are ill-defined, and 
regardless of the national climate and policy guidance, there is little progressive change in 
the academic community regarding campus preparedness and resiliency.  
Surveys are not enough. Checklists, guidance documents, and presidential 
directives have not been enough. Practiced action and proven programs must be evaluated 
to determine what truly works for campus resiliency. Evaluating a proposed model against 
recurring higher education emergency management issues could be a start.  
                                                 
71 Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, 
Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal 2, no. 4 (July 
2006), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/167. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research offers a single exploratory case study of the Oregon Campus 
Resilience Consortium. This study follows Robert Stakes’s classification of an intrinsic 
study.72 The research is focused on what this consortium is implementing to improve the 
emergency management programming and resiliency of academic institutions across the 
state. Over the upcoming years, the consortium’s work should provide the opportunity to 
learn if actions taken by Oregon address the recurring IHE emergency management issues 
found throughout literature. Though Oregon did not set out to address these specific issues 
when designing the consortium, this type of case study is useful to gain understanding 
about the complex nature of emergency management in higher education and potential 
ways recurring gaps can be resolved.  
The researcher chose to review the Oregon consortium as a proactive look into what 
the state is initiating. This exploratory study provides a baseline for potential gaps that 
Oregon’s program may address. As the Oregon program is implemented, progress can be 
measured against this initial baseline research in future studies to accurately determine 
what is working and what is not and if the model has addressed any recurring issues. This 
will provide proven initiatives, if any, in the Oregon plan that other states can adopt.  
This research is relevant and timely. With man-made and natural disasters on the 
rise, and FEMA’s goal of a “secure and resilient nation,” having resilient IHEs would 
strengthen communities.73 Additionally, universities and colleges have to strategically 
look toward the future. With ever-changing technology, rising disaster frequency, and the 
possibility of continued budget cuts, academic institutions need to ensure preparedness 
goals are achieved before something happens. How will institutions ensure they can meet 
their goals in ten to twenty years if funding is not available? Are there resources that remain 
untapped? Exploring these solutions through a proposed model will benefit future research.  
                                                 
72 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1995), 3. 
73 FEMA, National Preparedness Goal, second edition (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2015), 1, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25959; “A secure and resilient 
nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” 
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The case study includes a section for each category—planning, engagement, and 
resources—and analyzes gaps with the Oregon Campus Resilience Consortium model to 
see how the proposed plan could provide solutions. The main body of work used for this 
case study is a report produced by a multidisciplinary team, titled “Campus Safety at 
Oregon Post-secondary Education Institutions: A Report from the Oregon Campus Safety 
Work Group.”74 The report outlines the proposals of the work group and how the 
recommendations will be implemented. Using one case study cannot validate or disprove 
the model, but it can provide a basis for future research, as this concept is still in its draft 
form and has not yet been implemented across Oregon. Additionally, because the model 
has not yet been implemented, limitations in the effectiveness, cost, and other analysis may 
be estimated or projected. 
  
                                                 
74 University of Oregon Community Planning Workshop, “Campus Safety at Oregon Post-secondary 
Education Institutions: A Report from the Oregon Campus Safety Work Group” (report, University of 
Oregon, 2016), https://gis.uoregon.edu/campussafety/OCSWG_Full_Report_FNL_11-04-16.pdf. 
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II. INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION LANDSCAPE 
IHEs are unique environments with distinct populations, which make them 
vulnerable to a variety of man-made and natural disasters. This chapter explores what 
makes academic institutions unique compared to other institutions in their jurisdiction. 
Challenges faced by campus emergency management practitioners and solutions to the 
issues identified in the literature review could be affected by the nuances that come with 
academia, such as the transient population, governance, or environment. The following 
sections provide an overview of the IHE landscape and potential planning challenges.   
A. HIGHER EDUCATION TYPES AND STATISTICS 
Higher education can refer to a university, college, postsecondary school, tertiary 
education institutions, or third-state or third-level education institution, though it is mostly 
thought of as simply “college.” There are many types of alternative degrees, program areas, 
and certificates that one can pursue in higher education. This type of education can be 
sought through a variety of institutions, most being described as one of four types—private, 
public, two-year, or four-year institutions—though there are intricacies and outliers.75 
IHEs can be urban or rural, oftentimes spanning large geographical areas; many IHEs serve 
more than one city, state, or even county. The University of Kansas, for example, has a 
large public university in Lawrence, Kansas, a medical center contiguous with a private 
hospital in Kansas City, Kansas, and various other schools and programmatic work sites 
across the state.76 Additionally, many IHEs have distance-learning programs, which serve 
students remotely but still depend on the campus infrastructure. Table 2, however, outlines 
the two broad, overarching IHE classifications: public and private. Some geographic and 
demographic traits apply to both private and public institutions and are not listed in the 
table; for instance, the IHEs described in Table 2 can be located in either rural or urban 
environments and can have either large or small populations.  
                                                 
75 “Types of Postsecondary Schools and Education,” e Reference Desk, accessed January 25, 2018, 
http://www.ereferencedesk.com/education/types-of-schools/#Types of Postsecondary Schools. 
76 The University of Kansas, accessed January 26, 2018, https://ku.edu. 
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College or University for 
Profit: Runs as a business. 
Varied in academic emphasis, backgrounds, 
and character. For example, some may be 
religious and others secular. More costly than 
state institutions, even if similar. 
College or University Non-
profit: Independent and not 
funded by state. 
Junior College: Independent 
and privately funded. 
Comparable to community colleges. More 
costly than state institutions, even if similar. 
Public 
Institutions  
Community College (Junior 
College, Technical College): 
Awards 2-year associate’s 
degrees, certificates, or 
vocational degrees.  
Less strenuous standards for admission. 
Usually cheaper than a 4-year college. 
Supported by state and local revenues. 
Majority serve nearby community members by 
offering technical courses and continuing 
education courses. 
College: Awards 2-year 
associate’s degrees, 
bachelor’s, and advanced 
degrees. 
Colleges can offer a broad range of curriculum 
or specialized degrees. Usually smaller than a 
university, affording students more personal 
care from faculty. 
University: Awards 2-year 
degrees, bachelor’s degrees, 
and master’s degrees, 
including for specialized 
graduate programs (e.g., 
medical or law).  
Larger than a college. Often has a large course 
range and plenty of resources. Depending on 
the university, class sizes are often larger, but 
vary based on the university size and course 
type. 
 
There are over 4,000 IHEs across the United States, as shown in Figure 3, which 
contains data gathered by the Department of Education.78 These IHEs offer an associate’s 
degree or higher and participate in federal financial aid programs.79 Their communities are 
vast, employing approximately 3.9 million people and educating roughly 20.2 million 
                                                 
77 Adapted from “Types of Schools,” Federal Student Aid, May 16, 2017, https://studentaid.ed.gov/ 
sa/prepare-for-college/choosing-schools/types; Laura Bridgestock, “Guide to Types of University in the 
US,” Top Universities, February 17, 2015, https://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/choosing-
university/guide-types-university-us; “Types of Postsecondary Schools and Education,” e Reference Desk, 
accessed January 25, 2018, http://www.ereferencedesk.com/education/types-of-schools/#Types of 
Postsecondary Schools. 
78 “Digest of Education Statistics, 2015,” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed June 5, 
2017, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/ch_3.asp. 
79 “Characteristics of Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions,” National Center for Education 
Statistics, last updated May 2017, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_csa.asp. 
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students annually.80 That equates to a community of 24 million people. This personnel 
number does not account for the various types of allied institutional resources that college 
and university campuses may have (e.g., agricultural or engineering centers, medical 
centers), which could all potentially be considered resources for emergency management 
planning and response, depending on the institution and emergency management program.  
 
Figure 3.  Degree-Granting Institutions81 
 
Assessing and analyzing the needs of emergency management program 
requirements for higher education is challenging because of the various IHE types. 
Community colleges with a commuter population may have different emergency 
management needs than a large, rural university that houses 25,000 students. Institution 
size also affects individual IHE preparedness and response. Though there are no set 
standards on size, small institutions tend to have fewer than 5,000 students, medium 
                                                 
80 National Center for Education Statistics, “Characteristics”; “Digest of Education Statistics, 2015.” 
81 Source: National Center for Education Statistics, “Digest of Education Statistics, 2015.” 
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intuitions have between 5,000 and 15,000, and large institutions have more than 15,000 
students.82 Different amenities accompany these varying sizes; smaller institutions may 
offer more personalized attention to students, or serve a very specified career track (e.g., 
medical centers), whereas large institutions could have more resources, including resources 
for disaster response. Size of the institution is not the only factor when reviewing amenities; 
the jurisdiction (county, city, or town) in which the IHE resides is another key 
consideration. A small college in an urban city could have more response resources than a 
large college in a rural area, assuming the campus relies on the county for disaster 
assistance. A program that leverages the strengths and weaknesses of each individual 
institution could strengthen the resiliency of a region. Understanding the higher education 
environment is an important component to planning because academic communities may 
offer distinct resources, based on IHE type, to the jurisdictions in which they reside.  
B. ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
The campus setting, transient population, geographic structure, and cultural 
variances are just some of the distinctions that make IHE emergency management planning 
challenging. University and college campuses are built to be open and welcoming; they 
invite students, staff, and visitors to come and go at ease. The educational environment is 
one of research and learning, often having buildings accessible at all hours for students to 
study. Depending on the type of IHE, this could mean accessibility at all hours in heavily 
urbanized or rural communities, bringing varying security concerns to the institutions.  
Colleges and universities tend to house concentrated populations often comprising 
young high school graduates who are leaving home for the first time and are not used to 
being self-sufficient; this leaves them ill-prepared for emergencies.83 And older students 
who do not fit this typical student model may hold a myriad of responsibilities outside of 
school. As numbers of both younger and older students continue to rise, it will be 
challenging to plan emergency management capabilities to accommodate the diversity of 
                                                 
82 “College Size: Small, Medium or Large?,” COLLEGEdata, accessed January 26, 2018, 
https://www.collegedata.com/cs/content/content_choosearticle_tmpl.jhtml?articleId=10006. 
83 Frances L. Edwards and Daniel C. Goodrich, “The Role of Transportation in Campus Emergency 
Planning” (report, Mineta Transportation Institute, 2009), 1. 
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the student body.84 Additionally, the population changes from day to day and year to 
year.85 Campus populations are diverse and transient: students graduate and populations 
change from semester to semester, depending on the program. Academic institutions also 
see a growing international population, bringing students who may be unfamiliar with U.S. 
culture, the English language, and hazards of the area.86 If emergency management 
programs do not encompass institutional demographics, much of the campus may lack 
knowledge of emergency management plans and procedures. An IHE’s geography causes 
additional challenges for emergency management practitioners, as IHEs can span multiple 
cities, states, and countries. Emergency management leaders may be expected to provide 
continuity and preparedness planning for their virtual student bodies, too. 
C. VULNERABILITIES 
College and university campuses face the same natural and man-made disasters as 
their jurisdictional counterparts. Natural disasters are on the rise in the United States, and 
terrorist threats to educational institutions are increasing worldwide.87 FEMA’s Building 
a Disaster Resistant University guide conveys that over the past decade disasters have been 
occurring at a disturbingly increasing frequency at U.S. IHEs, at times causing death and 
injury and always imposing economic challenges for the institutions as they recover.88 In 
2003, then-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert S. Mueller stated that 
IHEs, as soft targets, could see increasing terrorist attacks, as their accessibility makes them 
                                                 
84 “Table 303.40. Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Attendance 
Status, Sex, and Age: Selected Years, 1970 through 2026,” National Center for Education Statistics, 
accessed July 14, 2018, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.40.asp?current=yes. 
85 U.S. Department of Education, Action Guide, 1. 
86 “Enrollment Trends: Previous Years,” Institute of International Education, accessed July 24, 2018, 
https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Enrollment/Enrollment 
-Trends. 
87 “Overview of Natural Catastrophe Figures for 2016,” Munich RE, March 27, 2017, 
https://www.munichre.com/topics-online/en/2017/topics-geo/overview-natural-catastrophe-2016; Gillian 
Chan, “HigherEd,” Is Your University Prepared for Threat and Evacuation? (blog), June 2, 2017, 
http://highered.easyuni.com/2017/06/is-your-university-prepared-for-threat-and-evacuation/. 
88 FEMA, Building a Disaster-Resistant University, iii; DRU gives numerous examples throughout 
the guide of disasters that have caused IHEs economic challenges (e.g., June 2001 tropical storm Texas at 
Houston Medical School had $205 million in damage; Northridge earthquake caused a loss of $380 million 
for California State University, etc.). 
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easy targets.89 Additionally, a study completed in 2014 by the University of Maryland’s 
Global Terrorism Database shows that terrorist attacks targeting educational institutions 
began dramatically increasing in 2004.90 Figures 4 and 5 show the upward trend for natural 
disasters in the United States, and for terrorist events at IHEs internationally. Campus 
emergency management professionals should consider these trends as they build their 
programs. Both terrorism and natural disasters are portions of the core mission areas that 
DHS has prioritized: mitigating, preventing, and ensuring resilience.91  
 
Figure 4.  Natural Disasters Increasing across the United States92  
                                                 
89 Robert S. Mueller, “Statement of the Record of Robert S. Mueller, III,” FAS, February 11, 2003, 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103mueller.html. 
90 Chan, “HigherEd.” 
91 “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 29, 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/our-mission. 
92 Source: Munich RE, “Natural Catastrophe Figures.” 
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Figure 5.  Terrorist Attacks Targeting Education Institutions Worldwide, 
1970–201393 
Due to their welcoming campuses and specific resources, IHEs may invite potential 
domestic and international terrorism alike.94 Their open environments have little security 
and the students and staff move around campus, which makes them soft targets for man-
made threats.95 Additionally, academic institutions have a wealth of information and 
equipment, from research labs and expensive medical equipment to chemical and radiation 
sources, personnel documents, and copious data and research stored electronically, which 
can be appealing to criminals.96  
                                                 
93 Source: Chan, “HigherEd.” 
94 Richard H. Martin, “Soft Targets Are Easy Terror Targets: Increased Frequency of Attacks, 
Practical Preparation, and Prevention,” Forensic Research and Criminology Journal 3, no. 2 (2016): 
00087, http://medcraveonline.com/FRCIJ/FRCIJ-03-00087.pdf; David B. Muhlhausen and Jena Baker 
McNeill, Terror Trends: 40 Years’ Data on International and Domestic Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
Heritage Foundation, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/terror-trends-40-years-data-
international-and-domestic-terrorism; “The Top Ten Schools Supporting Terrorists,” Frontpage Mag, 
October 5, 2016, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/264397/top-ten-schools-supporting-terrorists-
frontpagemagcom. 
95 Rick Amweg and Paul Denton, “Why Do Terrorists Target Colleges and Universities?,” Campus 
Safety, February 7, 2017, http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/why_terrorists_target_colleges_ 
campus_universities/. 
96 Erica Hupka, “Innovation Increase: How Technology Can Create Open, Decentralized, and 
Trackable Data Sharing” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 2–8; Amweg and Denton, 
“Why Do Terrorists Target Colleges and Universities.” 
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D. MISSION 
IHEs’ core educational missions clearly separate them from other institutions in 
their jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in terms of the services they provide to the campus members 
and surrounding communities, they are quite similar. Separate from their educational 
missions, IHEs usually operate businesses such as restaurants, hotels, retail and shopping 
outlets, and sporting complexes, each adding another challenge to emergency management 
planning.97 
Many universities and colleges use some form of the incident command system, 
planning to utilize the county team for assistance in preparedness and response. However, 
planning and response differ between the campus and other institutions in the jurisdiction. 
For instance, IHEs cannot rely upon the hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA) conducted by 
the county because campuses have different threats than their surrounding jurisdictions and 
should perform HVAs specific to the individual institution. For example, looking at the 
Wyandotte County, Kansas, HVA, the highest-ranked hazards include utility infrastructure 
failure, hazardous materials, and winter weather.98 Conversely, the University of Kansas 
Medical Center in Wyandotte County, Kansas, ranked its highest hazards as cybersecurity 
incidents, winter weather, and mass casualty incidents.99 Academic institutions also tend 
to have their own utilities and generators, and their own expectations in an emergency. 
HVA planning and response to vulnerabilities will vary.  
The municipality’s emergency procedures may not coincide with the IHE’s. 
Hurricane Katrina is one example. As a result of the hurricane and flooding, fourteen IHEs 
in Louisiana had to close for extended periods of time. School administrators, not the 
municipality, had to find continuity of education for the approximately 100,000 displaced 
                                                 
97 Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpaslan, “How Prepared,” 63. 
98 Wyandotte County Emergency Management, “Wyandotte County Emergency Operations Plan” 
(planning document, Wyandotte County, 2012), 18, 
https://www.wycokck.org/WycoKCK/media/Emergency-Management/Documents/2012-Wyandotte-
County-Emergency-Operations-Plan.pdf. 
99 Data obtained during interviews with University of Kansas Medical Center subject-matter experts, 
January 2018. 
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students.100 Although collaborative proactive planning with the municipality is beneficial, 
disasters begin and end locally, including with the IHE, and campuses must be prepared to 
respond to their own objectives without relying on outside assistance.101 
E. GOVERNANCE 
IHEs are complex systems. Many different types of institutions are formally 
organized and managed, usually in a bureaucratic manner.102 Many campuses function 
like counties or municipalities, operating their own police forces and fire departments. The 
University of Kansas Medical Center’s police force operates as a separate jurisdiction but 
collaborates with the surrounding city police agencies.103 If an incident occurs within the 
University of Kansas Medical Center jurisdiction, city police will not respond unless 
requested by the University of Kansas Medical Center police force.  
IHEs have to abide by state statutes in congruence with their surrounding 
municipality.104 However, IHEs must align with federal requirements, which mandate 
specific documentation and response in emergency incidents, oftentimes with higher 
expectations than required by municipality responses—as demonstrated by various laws 
enacted due to events and emergencies on campus, such as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of 
Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statics Act, also known as the Clery Act.105 
                                                 
100 “New Orleans Universities Open after Hurricane Katrina,” PBS, accessed July 13, 2017, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education-jan-june06-colleges_1-17/. 
101 FEMA, National Response Framework, 10. 
102 “Colleges and Organizational Structure of Universities - Governing Boards, The President, 
Faculty, Administration and Staff, Students, Future Prospects,” Education Encyclopedia, accessed July 2, 
2017, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1859/Colleges-Universities-Organizational-
Structure.html. 
103 Accredited through CALEA, which is not a requirement for police departments. “About the 
University of Kansas Police Department,” University of Kansas Medical Center, accessed July 11, 2017, 
http://www.kumc.edu/police-and-security-services.html. 
104 “State Universities Granted Same Powers as Municipalities and Counties—Authority to Issue 
Bonds,” Utah Code, Title 11 Ch. 17 § 17, 1993, https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title11/Chapter17/C11-17-
S17_1800010118000101.pdf. 
105 American Council on Education, “Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities: Report 




The Clery Act is a federal statute enacted after a student at Lehigh University was raped 
and murdered in her campus residence hall in 1986.106 This law mandates additional 
requirements for counting crimes, campus training, and emergency management 
procedures. This additional strain of regulatory oversight could be why there is lack of 
engagement in emergency management—campus resources are put elsewhere. These 
regulatory requirements are mandated for IHEs, even though campuses tend to be safer 
than the general community. The community has higher expectations for postsecondary 
institutions than it does for other businesses and even municipalities in the jurisdiction; 
IHEs are expected to ensure the safety of their students.  
F. SUMMARY 
The IHE landscape is challenging for emergency management program managers. 
Maintaining continuous engagement with a high-turnover, transient population, or staff and 
faculty who are not invested in emergency management, is difficult. Program management 
across state borders requires multiple plans, and a variety of external stakeholders who 
bring their own authorities and policies. Maintaining security while still catering to an open 
campus environment is also an ongoing issue. The unique IHE landscape must be taken 
into account for emergency management planning.  
                                                 
Virginia Tech is one example of an incident that leads parents, students, lawmakers, and media to as if 
campuses were safe. Numerous regulations and law were put into place after this event; Chris Rasmussen 
and Gina Johnson, “The Ripple Effect of Virginia Tech: Assessing the Nationwide Impact on Campus 
Safety and Security Policy and Practice” (report, Midwestern Higher Education Compact, 2008), 
https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED502232. 
Murder of a college student in 1986 enacted the Clery Act, required to be followed by IHEs receiving 
any Title IV funding; “Summary of the Jeanne Clery Act,” Clery Center, accessed July 24, 2018, 
https://clerycenter.org/policy-resources/the-clery-act/. 
106 Clery Center, “Summary of the Jeanne Clery Act.” 
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III. THE OREGON MODEL 
In 2000, FEMA piloted the Disaster Resistant University program.107 The grant 
program, which supplied guidance and grant money, was beta tested with six universities 
that were working to become more disaster resistant.108 However, the program was 
terminated in 2005 and no new grants have been given. Though the University of Oregon 
was not one of the six pilot universities, the school found value in the program and worked 
with the University of Washington (a grant test school) to preserve this common-sense 
approach for emergency management and crisis planning. They quickly began the Disaster 
Resilient Universities (DRU) listserv to continue the conversation among higher education 
practitioners charged with preparedness planning.109 Today, the listserv reaches 
approximately 800 institutions and has 1,400 members. The DRU listserv concept evolved 
over time; it spawned caucuses and groups, including the University and College Caucus 
and the National Intercollegiate Mutual Aid Agreement (NIMAA) program. The 
University of Oregon has been leading these emergency management innovations.  
Despite new programs and outreach, there were still issues in Oregon that bubbled 
to the surface after the Umpqua Community College shootings in October 2015. In 
response to this crisis, Governor Kate Brown established the Oregon Campus Safety Work 
Group (or Work Group).110 The Work Group produced a report titled “Campus Safety at 
Oregon Post-secondary Education Institutions,” which outlines the group’s proposals and 
how its recommendations should be implemented.111 The majority of the following case 
study is based on this report, which is evaluated against the recurring campus issues in 
resources, planning, and engagement.  
                                                 
107 FEMA, Building a Disaster-Resistant University. 
108 Arthur Oyola Yemaiel, “Disaster Resistant Universities: In Search of Strategies for Resilient 
Higher Education Institutions,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 24, no. 2 
(August 2006): 4, http://ijmed.org/articles/224/download/. 
109 “Disaster Resilient Universities (DRU) Network,” University of Oregon, April 1, 2016, 
https://safety.uoregon.edu/disaster-resilient-universities-network. 
110 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety.” 
111 University of Oregon. 
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A. IHEs IN OREGON 
Oregon has more than fifty-five two- and four-year IHEs, which enroll over 
350,000 students statewide.112 The institutions are rural and urban, large and small, 
including seven public universities, twenty-four private, four-year institutions, seventeen 
public community colleges, and a number of other trade schools and independent colleges. 
Figure 6 shows a map produced by the Work Group displaying the location of each 
institution.  
 
Figure 6.  Map of IHEs in Oregon113 
  
                                                 
112 University of Oregon, 1. 
113 Source: University of Oregon, title page. 
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Three organizations support the campuses and universities in Oregon:  
• Oregon Community College Association supports the publicly chartered 
community colleges, including faculty, staff, administration, and students.114 
• Oregon Alliance of Independent Colleges and Universities represents a 
number of accredited, nonprofit, private colleges and universities across the 
state.115 
• Higher Education Coordinating Commission (HECC) is a fourteen-member, 
governor-appointed volunteer commission that develops and implements 
programs and policies in support of Oregon’s higher education network.116 
Similar to IHEs across the nation, the academic institutions in Oregon provide research, 
education, patient care, and many other services. They are also considered part of the 
community, and are some of the state’s largest employers.117 In times of crisis, IHEs are 
often key stakeholders in response, sending resources and helping the community recover.  
B. WORK GROUP STRUCTURE 
The Work Group was charged to enable a coordinated approach across the IHE 
system and analyze protocols and practices to effectively manage future responses and 
increase campus resiliency.118 Members of the group were divided into four 
multidisciplinary subgroups to develop recommendations: 
• leadership and policy: focused on implementation of the recommendations 
from the other subgroups; 
                                                 
114 “About Us,” Oregon Community College Association, accessed July 25, 2018, 
http://occa17.com/about-us/. 
115 “About Us,” Oregon Alliance of Independent Colleges and Universities, accessed July 25, 2018, 
http://oaicu.org/about-us/. 
116 “Higher Education Coordinating Commission,” Oregon.gov, accessed April 22, 2018, 
http://www.oregon.gov/highered/about/Pages/commission.aspx. 
117 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 1. 
118 University of Oregon, i. 
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• response, continuity, and recovery: focused on filling gaps for IHEs for 
disaster response, for both short-term response and long-term recovery; 
• physical security and law enforcement: analyzed access to officers and law 
enforcement infrastructure, such as cameras and alarms; and  
• behavioral threat assessment prevention: focused on policies that could 
mitigate the impact of an incident, or lower the risk of an incident.119 
The subgroups crossed categorical lines; for example, the physical security and law 
enforcement subgroup looked at information relating to response, continuity, and recovery. 
The subgroups worked independently, reviewing case studies, policies, and strategies of 
various programs across the nation.120 
Each multidisciplinary team consisted of internal stakeholders such as campus 
faculty, staff, and students from various IHE types and external stakeholders like state 
police and staff from the HECC.121 No subgroups were the same; for example, the 
response, continuity, and recovery subgroup consisted of eleven people from nine different 
organizations, including community colleges, universities, campus police departments, and 
the governor’s office. The leadership subgroup, on the other hand, had only six personnel. 
Keeping the state’s overall mission in mind, the Work Group made sure each subgroup 
contained subject-matter experts, was small enough to make authoritative decisions, and 
included all applicable stakeholder groups in the process.  
Each subgroup met multiple times to discuss issues and develop recommendations. 
For example, the response, continuity, and recovery subgroup met approximately five 
                                                 
119 University of Oregon, 2. 
120 University of Oregon, 3; previous research included: “Matric of Campus Safety and Security 
Needs for Oregon Community Colleges” (2016), “National Campus Emergency Management Needs 
Assessment” (2016), “Securing Our Future: Best Practice Recommendations for Campus Safety and 
Violence Prevention” (2016), “Oregon Task Force on School Safety Report to the Oregon State 
Legislature” (2015), and “The Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety in Oregon Recommendations and 
Summary” (2008). Many of these documents are also included as part of this case study. 
121 University of Oregon; a full subgroup list can be found in the introduction of the report. 
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times between June and October 2016, and brought back recommendations to the larger 
work group for approval.  
A number of recurring issues emerged when the subgroups analyzed past studies 
and research, including:   
• lack of resources to support emergency management programs, including 
emergency management staffing, mutual aid, and budget dollars;  
• incomplete plans for emergency management assessment, response, and 
recovery (e.g., emergency operation plans, adequate hazard and vulnerability 
analysis, and continuity planning); and 
• absence of engagement from all levels within the institution, most notably in 
upper management.122   
The Work Group’s report also incorporated information and feedback from various internal 
and external stakeholders that regularly collaborate with the academic institutions, such as 
the state fire marshal, journalism students, campus safety professionals, and DRU 
members.123 Critical information was also assessed through three surveys, which the Work 
Group analyzed to determine the needs of Oregon IHEs.124  
The report and surveys specifically focused on Oregon’s top challenges: lack of 
funding and resources, insufficient training, and inadequate staffing. Through the various 
subgroups, the Work Group identified a number of recommendations; this case study 
focuses on resources, plans, and engagement. The following chapter dives deeper into each 
category and analyzes the issues against Oregon’s proposed model.   
  
                                                 
122 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs Assessment”; Campus Safety & 
Security Project, “Results of Survey”; Sullivan, “2011 Higher Education Emergency Management Survey”; 
Margolis Healy, “Campus Safety Survey.” 
123 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 3; a full list of Work Group participants can be found in 
the report. 
124 University of Oregon, 3; three surveys included: “Physical Safety and Law-Enforcement Survey,” 
“National Center for Campus Public Safety Higher Education and Emergency Management Needs 
Assessment Survey,” and “Physical Security Needs Inventory.” 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The themes of resources, planning, and engagement warrant additional analysis. It 
is clear from past research that surveys and recommendations have not been effective at 
increasing emergency management program understanding; if they were, these common 
problem themes would not recur. Perhaps trial and error of programs and policies is what 
is necessary for progressive change in IHE emergency management programs. Exploring 
Oregon’s proposed program will provide a good baseline; it can help determine if the 
planned activities could mitigate common challenges.  
The case study in this chapter examines each category independently, first 
reviewing their possible root causes and the strategies other institutions have used in an 
attempt to address them. The case study then examines the Oregon model to see how the 
program could mitigate challenges previously identified by campuses. It is important to 
note that the categories can be interdependent; often, staffing issues in emergency 
management are blamed on budget constraints…and poor planning or infrequent training 
exercises are blamed on staffing issues…while poor campus or community engagement 
are blamed on infrequent training exercises. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to influence one 
area without affecting others. Sections of the case study are therefore, by necessity, 
mutually reliant. 
A. RESOURCES 
When discussing emergency management, resources can include a number of 
items. Personnel, budget, and mutual aid were all listed as resource needs in the literature 
review, particularly finance, staffing, and mutual aid. Mutual aid can include mutual aid 
agreements, by which resources and assistance are agreed upon in advance. Connections 
to external stakeholders count, as you cannot have mutual aid agreements without external 
stakeholder engagement. In this chapter, mutual aid is analyzed in both the resources and 
engagement sections.  
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1. Environment 
As discussed in Chapter I, Section A, many IHEs are experiencing budget cuts each 
year, which could mean less funding for emergency management activities if those 
activities are not prioritized. Additionally, tuition and fee increases are on the rise. Figure 7, 
from Washington State’s Budget and Policy Center, shows an average decrease in state 
funding for IHEs, together with the rising tuition costs needed to cover the difference.125 
In addition to budget battles, emergency managers also have to ensure engagement and 
buy-in from the students as they begin funding more and more IHE initiatives.  
 
Figure 7.  State Funding for IHEs Decreases as Tuition for Students Increases126 
                                                 
125 Washington State Budget and Policy Center, “Cuts to Higher Education Lead to Increases in 
Tuition,” Schmudget Blog, June 6, 2012, http://budgetandpolicy.org/schmudget/cuts-to-higher-education-
lead-to-increases-in-tuition. 
126 Source: Washington State Budget and Policy Center. 
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Emergency management in higher education may appear short staffed either 
because of the number of personnel or because the personnel tasked with emergency 
management are overwhelmed with other duties as well. If IHEs have emergency 
managers, the managers are also often responsible for security, Clery, or a number of other 
additional duties.127 Oftentimes, especially in smaller IHEs, no specifically identified 
emergency manager exists and the tasks of the emergency management program fall to the 
student affairs director, security officer, or environmental health and safety manager.128 
Geographic footprints, student turnover, the level of preparedness maintenance expected 
on campus, and other nuances discussed in Chapter II offer additional challenges to the 
emergency management staff.  
Shared services may address staffing and financial resource constraints, as 
observed in a study by Rebekah Green.129 Three IHEs in Washington addressed resource 
limitations by pooling resources through a consortium. These colleges found it difficult to 
maintain compliance with drills, exercises, and plans and did not have the funds to support 
three separate positions for emergency planning. The campuses adopted a shared-services 
model and hired a single half-time staff person responsible for coordination. Through this 
program, the institutions were able to complete compatible emergency plans, develop 
videos to institutionalize the culture of preparedness, and conduct joint exercises. The 
consortium offers a collaborative atmosphere of IHE accountability and competition that 
could be an example for other institutions. Additionally, providing compliant templates to 
emergency managers who are overwhelmed with other duties, or to personnel who hold 
entirely different positions (e.g., student affairs administrator) but have emergency 
management tasks, will lessen the load. The next section evaluates the Oregon model to 
                                                 
127 James A. Hyatt, Ready to Respond: Case Studies in Campus Safety and Security (Washington, 
DC: National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2010); Rebekah Green, “Resilient 
Campuses: Leveraging Resources among Small- and Moderate-Sized Institutions of Higher Education,” 
Journal of Emergency Management 12, no. 1 (February 2014): 23, https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.2014.0159; 
Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 80–83. 
128 Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 81. 
129 Green, “Resilient Campuses.” 
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see if a shared-services model or other proactive strategies are included to mitigate IHE 
budget and staffing constraints. 
2. Oregon Model 
Looking specifically at the Oregon model, the Work Group also identified staffing 
and budget issues as an emergency management concern. The Work Group concluded that 
Oregon institutions do see emergency management as a priority. To address resource 
needs, the group recommended four options:  
• establish a shared-services emergency management program; 
• develop an IHE-specific all-hazards incident management team (IMT); 
• adopt the NIMAA for all Oregon IHEs; and, 
• hire two full-time employees to support the developing program.130 
a. Shared Services 
Mirroring the Washington consortium, the Work Group recommended shared 
services in some areas for resource and budget consciousness. Recognizing the need for 
statewide training, resource allocation, and general coordination, the Work Group is 
recommending a Higher Education Safety and Resilience Council (or Council) to 
coordinate cooperation between departments and agencies.131 The state believes that 
increasing cooperation would enable the institutions to share resources and eliminate 
duplicative efforts. This would be completed by hiring two people in shared services 
positions to serve as the Council coordinator and the training and resources coordinator.132 
The coordinators would spearhead collaboration in the networked system. These positions 
would require new funding; however, they could also help save money across a number of 
institutions. For example, if five IHEs do not have emergency management positions but 
                                                 
130 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” iii. 
131 University of Oregon, 6. 
132 University of Oregon; discussed further in section C, 2, a., 7. 
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have personnel able to complete and customize an emergency operations plan template 
specific to their school’s needs, then having personnel at the state level providing consistent 
templates to them would benefit the institutions.  
Oregon developed the consensus that IHEs need financial support, awareness of 
best practices, and training to improve plans, such as emergency operations and continuity 
plans.133 The Work Group recommended implementation of statewide training templates, 
which should be made for and shared with all postsecondary schools, to ensure consistent 
training and planning across the state. The training models would be made and 
disseminated by the Council coordinator and training resources coordinator. The Work 
Group also recommended using students and faculty as resources to create short training 
videos, which the coordinators could then distribute to all campuses.134  
Shared services would also help with training, another commonly identified issue 
for the campus network.135 Training and exercises do require resources and time; a good 
full-scale or functional exercise can take up to twelve months to plan.136 The Work Group 
recommended that a statewide training program be established using the shared-services 
model and personnel.137 The model would follow an established program in Oregon called 
“Partnership for Disaster Resilience” and would garner personnel from IHEs who would 
travel across the state and provide training.  
b. All-Hazards Incident Management Team 
According to the Work Group report, IHEs do not have enough trained staff 
members needed to respond to a crisis.138 To alleviate this need, the Work Group 
                                                 
133 University of Oregon, 11. 
134 University of Oregon, 12, 23; University of Oregon students and faculty created a training called 
“Unspoken” for active-shooter threats, which has been a successful. However, the journalism students 
believed that short training videos would be an important vehicle to expand training. 
135 University of Oregon, 12; National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs 
Assessment.” 
136 FEMA, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32326. 
137 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 9. 
138 University of Oregon, 10. 
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recommended that institutions across the state form a networked response by implementing 
education-based all-hazards IMTs.139 An IMT model has already been effectively 
implemented internally at the University of Oregon, where the IMT is trained to a FEMA 
level Type III, and is divided into two groups: the Emergency Operations Center Team and 
the Field Team.140 The University of Oregon IMT was able to assist Umpqua Community 
College for seven days in response to a 2015 shooting, which helped the Umpqua 
administrators with a variety of response and short-term recovery needs, such as business 
and academic continuity and communications.141 Having an IHE-centric response team 
that understands how campuses work is important for effective response. If a county-wide 
incident were to occur, though the traditional response team would try to help the college 
or university in any way it could, the team’s priorities would extend beyond campus 
boundaries. For an IHE-specific IMT, the main objective would be the continuation of 
education, which would improve the resiliency of those institutions. For Umpqua 
Community College, the deaths and injuries of campus community members were 
traumatic for leadership, staff, and students. Having to respond to your own institution’s 
disaster can often have unforeseen emotional consequences. Allowing responders you trust 
to come and help could allow the campus members to seek counseling and support. Good 
rapport builds trust, and many IHEs have relationships with each other, but do not have 
relationships with county first responders or state-level IMTs.  
Oregon plans to implement three to five statewide Type III IHE-specific IMTs. 
Campuses may choose to have an internal team or allow personnel to train and serve on a 
shared-services IMT. The Work Group surmised that these teams would help provide 
coverage across the state and be able to support campuses with response and recovery 
efforts. Training of these teams would be critical to their success, so some downsides for 
                                                 
139 University of Oregon, 10. 
140 “Incident Management Team,” University of Oregon, February 23, 2018, https://safety.uoregon. 
edu/incident-management-team; “An Overview of Incident Management Teams,” U.S. Fire Administration, 
February 9, 2016, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/imt/imt_overview.html. 
141 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 10. 
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the campuses may include the time needed for adequate training, and time away for 
response. This recommendation also meets the need for mutual aid.  
c. National Intercollegiate Mutual Aid Agreement 
Above and beyond the statewide team, the Work Group also recommended that all 
Oregon IHEs adopt the NIMAA program.142 This program recognizes that IHEs cannot 
“go it alone” and recommends that institutions can work together in terms of mutual aid. 
NIMAA is essentially a mutual aid agreement for IHEs that can be signed into by individual 
institutions before a disaster occurs, which would provide assistance to already resource-
constrained institutions. Similar to the IMT, in times of crisis, this model would allow for 
resource sharing and assistance from other IHE response practitioners across state lines. 
This would help with staffing issues during long-lasting events, when IHEs could quickly 
run out of resources. While the IMT would use state response teams and resources, looking 
beyond state boundaries offers a good contingency for bigger emergencies that affect a 
large portion of the state. 
d. Full-Time Staff 
The two new recommended staff members—the Council coordinator and the 
training and resources coordinator—would serve in a shared-services model and be housed 
at one university in the state, though their work would benefit all state postsecondary 
institutions.143 The coordinators would use existing plans, personnel, and models, such as 
the “Partnership for Disaster Resilience,” to create statewide templates for dispersal, or 
build new models for the state to approve and use. These templates would provide a layer 
of continuity and collaboration across the state for new training and planning standards. 
The duo’s oversight would also ensure accountability at the individual institutional level; 
both staff members would report directly to the Council, which would be expected to report 
                                                 
142 “IAEM-USA Universities and Colleges Caucus (UCC),” International Association of Emergency 
Managers, accessed July 27, 2018, http://www.iaem.com/page.cfm?p=groups/us-caucuses/universities-
colleges&lvl=2. 
143 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 6–7. 
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the program’s progress directly to the governor, state agency leaders, and the HECC.144 
However, a limitation of this model would be future administrative changes. When a new 
governor is appointed, he or she may have different goals and objectives for higher 
education in the state.  
These hires, along with a three-year statewide training initiative, would be 
implemented in phase one of the Work Group’s plan.145 According to the Work Group, 
the estimated cost of this phase is $500,000. If the campuses were expected to support this 
cost, it would be approximately $3,000 per campus, per year. To determine cost savings, 
this cost would have to be compared with the cost of doing nothing, and then experiencing 
a crisis.  
3. Conclusion: Resources Pros and Cons in the Oregon Model 
Table 3 summarizes the pros and cons of the Oregon model, in light of the 
emergency management issues identified in the literature. The “+” symbol in the table 
shows what needs the Oregon model addresses, and the “–” symbol demonstrates 
deficiencies in the model, or cons to implementation. For example, additional staff is a 
benefit for personnel, but the cost of the additional personnel is a con.  
  
                                                 
144 University of Oregon, iii, 6–7. 
145 University of Oregon, 25. 
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Personnel • Short staffed 
• EM role 
poorly defined 
• Additional 
duties on EM 
Shared services 
+ Allows for cooperation, continuity, and communication between IHEs. 
+ 
Additional staff not necessary when 
resources are shared and existing 
resources are effectively used. 
+ Eliminates duplicative work. 
– 
Model does not specifically address 
additional duties for emergency 
management (EM), or the exact EM roles. 
All-hazards 
IMT 
+ Fills staffing gap for crisis response. 
+ Trained personnel dedicated to IHEs able to help. 
– Time for training and response to other institutions. 
NIMAA + Allows for resource sharing across state lines. 
Full-time staff 
+ Coincides with shared services and allows consistency at each institution. 
+ Direct tracking of progress and frequent reports to the governor for accountability. 
– Could be easily eliminated based on administrative agendas. 
Budget • Budget cuts 




+ Saves money if IHEs do not need to fund 
an emergency manager at every 
institution. 
+ Saves money through shared resources. 
– Requires ongoing funding to support. 
All-hazards 
IMT 
+ Response is internal to IHEs, could be 
more cost effective than having a state 
IMT respond; also allows for shared 
resources. 
+ Knowledge of documentation of the 
response could allow for more accurate 
reimbursements. 
– Cost associated with training and 
response to other institutions. 
NIMAA + Allows for resource sharing across state lines. 
Full-time staff 
+ Maximizes resources by capitalizing on 
personnel and plans already in place. 
– Could be easily eliminated based on 
administrative agendas. 










• Lack of 










Allows for integration into city, county, 
and state response, building networks and 
mutual aid. 
+ Builds external stakeholders from other IHEs. 
NIMAA 
+ 
Builds mutual aid networks nationwide, 
maximizing resources for response as 
needed. 
+ Builds external stakeholders from other IHEs. 
– Not well defined for IHEs, and external stakeholders could remain inconsistent. 
Full-time staff – 
As a shared resource, would drive 
consistency across the state, building 
mutual aid continuity. 
 
The literature commonly points out that if campuses have a dedicated emergency 
manager, it is usually a single person who wears multiple hats.146 The report did not 
address specific taskings of Oregon academic emergency managers, so it is unknown if the 
“resource deficiency” is due to emergency managers being overtasked. The report also did 
not address prioritization of the emergency management program in the various 
universities and colleges. There could be instances where budget, and possibly personnel, 
are available but the institution does not see emergency management as a priority and 
therefore does not dedicate resources toward the program. Additionally, some studies note 
that where you sit as the emergency manager within your institutions affects your bottom 
line. The higher you are toward the top, the more budget allocations you may see.147 The 
organization charts of the Oregon campuses were not included within the report. Reviewing 
specific tasks of IHE emergency managers and analyzing how the prioritization of 
emergency management programs directly correlates, or does not correlate, to the 
emergency manager’s position within the organization would offer progressive benefits to 
the field in future studies.    
                                                 
146 Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 76–78. 
147 Farris and McCreight, 77. 
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B. PLANNING 
Planning is often cited as the most important component of emergency 
management.148 As noted in a number of after action reports in response to the Virginia 
Tech shooting and Hurricane Katrina, a well-rehearsed plan that includes personnel 
involved in decision-making practicing together at all levels of the university or college is 
the best way to build resiliency and to mitigate losses. 149 Plans can have diverse 
components; for this research, however, plans refer to emergency operations (EOP) and 
continuity plans, two documents noted to be key elements for an effective emergency 
management program.150 Training and exercises related to these plans are also discussed 
in this section.  
1. Environment 
As described in Chapter I, plans, mostly EOPs, are completed at a high percentage 
of universities and colleges. When surveyed, more than 80 percent of IHEs responded that 
their emergency plans were complete.151 However, upon closer examination, plans 
thought to be complete were missing foundational pieces (such as hazard vulnerability 
assessments), or students, faculty, and staff were unaware of the plan and their role in 
disaster response. Farris and McCreight assert that planning for IHEs is confusing and lacks 
continuity throughout the various campuses in terms of how emergency programs are 
organized and maintained.152 There is no blueprint for program organization and 
implementation in a campus setting, and the myriad of guidance documents could leave 
IHE planners confused. The guidance seemed to be clarified upon President George W. 
Bush’s enactment of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, after September 11, 
                                                 
148 Society for College and University Planning, The Presidential Role in Disaster Planning and 
Response: Lessons from the Front (Ann Arbor, MI: Society for College and University Planning), 
http://www.ncef.org/content/presidential-role-disaster-planning-and-response-lessons-front. 
149 Matthew A. Tarr et al., “Hurricane Katrina: Impacts at Four University Chemistry Departments in 
New Orleans,” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety 14, no. 5 (September 2007): 15–24, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2007.03.001; Davis, “Connecting the Dots”; Green, “Resilient Campuses.” 
150 Hyatt, Ready to Respond, 2. 
151 National Center for Campus Public Safety, “Program Needs Assessment,” 22. 
152 Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 86. 
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2001. This directive established a single national emergency management system, NIMS. 
The primary goal of NIMS was to ensure that all levels of government “work together to 
prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents.”153 
Any jurisdictions that receive federal funding are required to comply with NIMS, which, 
in the case of IHEs, includes receiving federal preparedness dollars from the Department 
of Education, DHS, or Department of Health and Human Services.154 NIMS is for all 
jurisdictional levels and is used to manage incidents ranging from minor traffic accidents 
to large-scale crises.155 As incidents occurred across the nation, the preparedness 
directives transformed, eventually culminating in the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) 
and National Preparedness System (NPS) as directed by Presidential Policy Directive 8. 
The NPS includes activities focused on developing a process for planning and preparedness 
activities in order for the “whole community” to achieve the NPG.156 The six components 
of the NPS (identifying and assessing risk, estimating capability requirements, building 
and sustaining capabilities, planning to deliver capabilities, validating capabilities, and 
reviewing and updating) work together to shape, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities 
needed to carry out the NPG. 
The goal of the NPG is to create “A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”157 The NPG details 
achievement of the goal as follows: 
 
                                                 
153 “NIMS: Frequently Asked Questions,” FEMA, accessed July 15, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/ 
pdf/emergency/nims/nimsfaqs.pdf. 
154 “NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Institutions of Higher Education,” Readiness 
and Emergency Management for Schools, accessed July 27, 2018, 1–2, https://rems.ed.gov/docs/NIMS_ 
ComprehensiveGuidanceActivities_2009-2010.pdf. 
155 FEMA, National Incident Management System, third edition (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2017), 1. 
156 FEMA, National Preparedness System (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2011); FEMA, National Preparedness Goal. 
157 FEMA, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
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• Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism. 
• Protecting our citizens, residents, visitors, assets, systems, and networks 
against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows our interests, 
aspirations, and way of life to thrive.  
• Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future 
disasters. 
• Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the environment, and 
meet basic human needs in the aftermath of an incident.  
• Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening, and 
revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and the economy, as well as the 
health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities 
affected by an incident.158  
There are five mission areas within the NPG: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery. Under each mission area are thirty-two defined core capabilities needed to 
achieve the goal. Table 4 outlines each of the mission areas and supporting capabilities. 
Additionally, national frameworks for each of the mission areas provide a common 
planning platform, allowing the whole community to work together for the greater 
accomplishment of the goal. These frameworks are meant to allow for whole-community 
information sharing, coordination, and teamwork by fostering an understanding of roles 
and responsibilities.159 
                                                 
158 FEMA, 1. 
159 “National Planning Frameworks,” FEMA, October 31, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/national-
planning-frameworks. 
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Table 4.   National Preparedness Goal Missions and Capabilities160 
 
 
In conjunction with FEMA, the Department of Education published the Guide for 
Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher 
Education.161 Similar to the NPG, this guide shares the same five mission areas of 
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. However, the guide makes no 
mention of the NPS, NPG, any of the thirty-two core capabilities, or the national 
frameworks. Similar to the NPG, the guide does encourage IHEs to utilize the standardized 
                                                 
160 Source: FEMA, National Preparedness Goal, 3. 
161 U.S. Department of Education, Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans 
for Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2013). 
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NIMS approach in response to disasters; however, the lack of continuity between the two 
documents may cause confusion even among planning professionals. This higher education 
guide stresses the importance of collaborative planning with community partners and 
stakeholders; however, their understanding at the city, county, or state level of emergency 
preparedness may align more with NPS and NPG doctrine. On top of the planning guidance 
are unfunded mandates. These mandates specify that IHEs must notify the community in a 
“reasonable” timeframe whenever threats to safety exist, and must inform the public 
annually of crimes and fires on campus.162  
Further guidance, such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 
and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) guidance standards, refer 
to improved practices in prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.  
These goals align with the five mission areas but do not address protection. Additionally, 
neither guidance document references the core capabilities or the national frameworks. 
Finally, federal documents and programs, such as Disaster Resistant University (not to be 
confused with the Disaster Resilient University or DRU Network) and Ready Campus, 
muddy the waters of a standardized approach similar to what the NPS is offering.163 Many 
guidance documents claim “flexibility” is a key component to their implementation. 
Though flexibility is beneficial within planning and preparation, inconsistencies within 
planning directives do not allow for a whole-community approach and limit how the IHE 
can integrate with external stakeholders for response efforts.  
The same confusion exists with continuity planning, which IHEs rarely complete. 
A number of studies show that social networks, connections, and stakeholder involvement 
enhance resiliency in institutions, as networks build trust and collaboration.164 After action 
reports following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also claim that having a “system 
                                                 
162 U.S. Department of Education, The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/ 
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membership” is vital for campus recovery and resiliency, noting that pre-existing 
agreements allow continuity of operations to continue.165 However, even internally, 
continuity planning is still limited, much less extended to key external stakeholders. EMAP 
and NFPA 1600 both address portions of continuity planning but provide only generalized 
guidance that could leave certain personnel more confused.   
In addition to simply having effective EOP and continuity plans, campuses must be 
able to test those plans. IHEs can use a number of federal guidance documents, such as the 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, for exercise development and 
testing.166 If these practices were standardized within the IHE community, as well as with 
external jurisdictions, the continuity in training and exercises could improve. Campuses 
have additional mandates from higher education–specific regulations, such as the Clery 
Act.167 These legal mandates differ from the FEMA guidance documents on training and 
exercises, adding to the emergency management program confusion. Even with the 
mandates, a number of IHEs do not actively participate in training and exercises, and if 
they do participate it tends to be only on an annual basis, which is not enough given the 
turnover rate at a typical IHE.168 
2. Oregon Model 
Campus emergency management programs must understand that type of planning 
that is necessary and then implement user-friendly plans. Once effective plans are in place, 
training and exercise programming to test the plans on a regular basis also need to be 
institutionalized. As the literature has shown, the EOP is often confusing or conflicting 
from one institution to the next, while continuity planning remains a major need among 
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many IHEs. The Work Group recognized this challenge among Oregon institutions and 
recommended the following steps to mitigate the incongruence of planning across the state:  
1. Establish a shared-services emergency management program and training 
model, as described in section A of this chapter, which would also apply 
to continuity and recovery planning. 
2. Establish an online resource directory to connect campuses on a daily 
basis. 
a. Shared Services 
As described in Section A of this chapter, the Work Group recommended a shared-
services team that would help with training and planning for all phases of emergency 
management.169 This model would build standardized planning templates, including EOP 
and continuity planning as needed, across the state, and the IMT training and resources 
coordinator would ensure plans are complete for all campuses. The Work Group felt this 
solution would ensure a coordinated strategy for the state’s postsecondary institutions.170  
The Oregon model also recommends building training and plan templates using the 
NFPA 1600 standard on Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, the 
EMAP, and FEMA’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), 
because a good threat assessment is necessary for emergency management program 
planning.171 Upon completion of planning, a training model following the model of the 
Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience would be implemented, to include training and 
plan testing.172  
                                                 
169 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 8. 
170 University of Oregon, 7. 
171 Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), 2016 Emergency Management 
Standard, ANSI/EMAP 4–2016 (Lexington, KY: EMAP, 2016), https://emap.org/index.php/root/about-
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Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (Quincy, MA: National Fire 
Protection Association, 2013); University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 9. 
172 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 9. 
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Although using EMAP, NFPA 1600, and THIRA would allow Oregon to offer 
continuity between postsecondary institutions, some disconnect remains between those 
documents, the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for 
Institutions of Higher Education, and FEMA’s NPG. Additional planning to ensure 
continuity between IHEs, the county, and the state would need to occur for shared 
stakeholder understanding.  
b. Online Resource Directory 
The Work Group noted that IHEs would benefit from awareness of best practices 
through an Oregon-specific resources directory and repository.173 Though the DRU, this 
Oregon-specific directory would unite campuses and be beneficial for planning. The online 
resource center that the Work Group recommended would collect best practices that IHEs 
could access as needed.  
Much like the DRU listserv—or any listserv, this directory could seem 
overwhelming depending on how it is managed. Staff time for development and upkeep of 
the system, time invested in compiling up-to-date and useful information, and hard costs 
to set up the tool are all projected within the Work Group report. The report estimated these 
costs to be approximately $20,000 to $50,000, and they are lumped with the phase one 
implementation costs.174 
3. Conclusion: Planning Pros and Cons in the Oregon Model 
The Oregon model plans to incorporate standardized planning with accountability 
across the state based on current best practices and national standards. A shared-services 
training program, in addition to helping with resource constraints, would ensure continuity 
in response and actions across the state. However, this may not fill the “confusion” gap. 
With so many guiding documents out there, and the county and state following NPG 
guidance, planning may still leave some questioning what approach to take. Effective 
training and consistency throughout the IHE system will be necessary to ensure success. 
                                                 
173 University of Oregon, 13. 
174 University of Oregon, 27. 
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Table 5 summarizes the pros and cons of the Oregon model in addressing the issues with 
planning found throughout the literature.  
Table 5.   The Oregon Model: Planning 
Planning Issues Oregon 
Model 
Assessment 







county, and state 
NPG planning 





+ Allows for consistency for plans using predesignated templates across IHEs. 
+ Builds plan blueprints and builds continuity. 
+ Eliminates duplicative work. 
– 
Templates may follow guidance different 
from city, county, and state (e.g., NFPA 
1600 vs. NPG); this could still cause 





+ Oregon-specific resource  
+ Trained personnel dedicated to IHEs able to help. 
– Ongoing cost for implementation and upkeep. 
– An additional resource, which could be overwhelming to users. 
 
C. ENGAGEMENT 
Another issue observed in the literature is lack of campus engagement. The 
engagement element is an odd dichotomy; administrators often voice that emergency 
management is important and offer their support, but the campus community knows little 
about emergency management plans and does not frequently participate in campus training 
and exercises. There could be a number of reasons for poor engagement. Even if 
administrators support campus emergency management in theory, it may be an additional 
duty that they do not have time for, especially when considering the low probability of 
emergency events. Finally, arduous training in unfamiliar territory, transient populations, 
and turnover could also contribute to poor engagement.  
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1. Environment 
Engaging leadership, faculty, staff, and students is a continued struggle within the 
preparedness community. Administrators have their own work to complete; they may run 
an entire institution or department, and wear many hats from day to day. Staff, similar to 
administrators, have daily jobs of their own. Attempting to navigate the learning 
environment of NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) could leave them 
confused; the curriculum does not lend to a user-friendly experience. Faculty are busy 
working on teaching and research and are often not full-time employees at one particular 
institution. And if plans are not congruent across university and college systems, then 
faculty members may have more than one plan to learn. Additionally, adjunct faculty 
numbers continue to increase due to budget cuts, but few institutions offer adjunct faculty 
members orientation to campus emergencies or additional pay and benefits for participation 
in events (e.g., training and exercises).175 Finally, students, engaged in their academic 
programs are disinterested in emergency management programs because they plan to 
graduate in the near future.  
IHEs differ from other county and city institutions, where roles are defined and 
tasks are consistent.176 For example, county transportation departments, fire and rescue 
services, and city police departments practice the responses they would use in a crisis every 
day (e.g., provide transportation, secure a perimeter, establish incident command). In a 
campus setting, first responders consist of administrators, faculty, staff, and potentially 
students who do not deal with crisis or high-stress situations on a daily basis. Therefore, 
response procedures must be “negotiated” with these solicited campus members who 
choose (or are assigned) to be trained and take ownership of their assigned responsibility. 
For instance, a researcher could be designated as an operations section chief and required 
to understand ICS terminology and response in accordance with FEMA guidance. The idea 
of stepping far outside of day-to-day tasks and assuming drastically different roles could 
                                                 
175 Denise Dedman and William J. Pearch, “Perspectives on Adjunct and Other Non-tenure Faculty,” 
The Community College Enterprise; Livonia 10, no. 1 (2004): 23, 31. 
176 Farris and McCreight, “Professionalization of Emergency Management,” 86. 
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be a reason for lack of engagement, as learning these skills in full takes time away from 
research, and there is no incentive to take on these additional tasks. 
The “National Higher Education Emergency Management Program Needs 
Assessment” found that leadership is important for engagement.177 If the leader shows up 
to exercises and trainings, other campus community members will follow.178 Some 
recommendations noted within the literature suggest that an emergency management 
curriculum and training program targeted at leadership would engage the executive levels. 
However, the same report claimed that staffing levels are inadequate for emergency 
management, which would make the recommendation difficult to enact.179 Additionally, 
the argument could be made that it is not about the availability of training; FEMA offers 
online ICS courses specifically designed for policy group leaders, executives, and senior 
officials.180 It is more likely that leadership are not engaged because they simply do not 
have enough time in the day, and proactive preparation for crisis response is not a priority. 
Adding an annual training requirement may not be able to close this gap, as the extra 
training hours would add more strain to an already packed schedule. Nevertheless, research 
has shown that repetitive training allows information to stick with personnel. Perhaps a 
better solution would be for emergency management staff to sit in and participate as a 
standing agenda item in leadership meetings, offering short but repetitive training nuggets. 
The constant view of emergency management and the continued updates in various 
segments of emergency preparedness could foster better engagement from leadership. 
Unhelpful or disinterested behavior due to relationship quality or trust may be 
another barrier to engagement, but could also be used to leverage a more effective program. 
Jessica Ford et al. note that it may be a problem with relationship quality that causes the 
campus community to deliberately ignore messages and other official emergency 
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management communications.181 Other studies find that cohesion of teams directly 
correlates to the number of interactions a team has; effective engagement requires network 
connectedness before a crisis occurs, support, and trust from stakeholders, which in turn 
improves response and recovery and bolsters overall program success.182 Nevertheless, 
harvesting these types of relationships does require energy, personnel, funding, and time, 
which—as discussed in Section A—are resources that are lacking.183 
External engagement is equally as important as internal engagement for a well-
developed emergency management program, but studies show that this type of 
engagement, either with stakeholder relationships or through mutual aid agreements, is 
lacking. Community stakeholders are important for the campuses, but the campuses also 
contribute to the community’s resiliency.184 Many agencies have worked to strengthen 
IHE and community partnerships after recognizing the role and resources that universities 
and colleges bring to preparedness and response.185 However, barriers still exist—
unfamiliarity with organizational personnel, cultural differences between academia and 
outside organizations, and concerns of ownership and legal issues inhibit effective 
engagement.186 These barriers, along with incomplete and disjointed planning for IHE 
contributions within the various jurisdictions, contribute to poor external stakeholder 
involvement. 
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2. Oregon Model 
As discussed, there are a number of potential reasons for poor engagement. Campus 
personnel could be too busy, they may not trust or have quality relationships with the 
emergency management professionals, or the program may not be a priority. Both internal 
and external engagement must be analyzed, as both groups of stakeholders are crucial to 
institutional and state resilience. As John Peters notes, “when a crisis hits, campus leaders 
may feel the need to manage the situation with only their resources, internally, on campus. 
However, crises events are complex, and it’s unrealistic to expect internal staff to have the 
expertise needed for all types of crises. It is important for the campus to reach out beyond 
the institution for specialized expertise.”187 To address engagement and ensure program 
implementation will work in Oregon, the Work Group recommended the following:  
• establishing a Higher Education Safety and Resilience Council and hiring a 
program coordinator, 
• establishing a statewide training model that engages campus community 
members,  
• establishing an IHE-specific all-hazards IMT, 
• integrating with state emergency management teams, and 
• adopting NIMAA. 
a. Higher Education Safety and Resilience Council and Coordinator 
The leadership and policy subgroup acknowledged that campus engagement is vital 
to the success of the program’s implementation.188 Committed faculty, staff, students, and 
especially leaders are of the utmost importance for resilient campuses. The literature 
pointed out that engagement in planning and program understanding were lacking because 
students and staff did not know what to do, or even if they had a plan; this demonstrates 
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that preparedness perceptions do not always align with reality.189 University and college 
assessments found that even with supposed leadership buy-in to emergency management 
initiatives, leadership was not engaged in exercises and planning, which must be prioritized 
if an effective program is the goal.190  
The Work Group report recognizes that current gaps in institutional engagement 
mirror past gaps.191 In 2008, in response to the Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois campus 
shootings, Oregon approved the Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety; although the 
task force made progress, it had clear shortcomings.192 The state created the task force to 
improve crisis response, security, and safety on Oregon campuses.193 The Work Group 
report claims that the 2008 initiative did not succeed due to lack of oversight. To address 
accountability, the Work Group recommended establishing the previously mentioned 
Higher Education Safety and Resilience Council.194 The Council would be a 
multidisciplinary group of IHE leaders, emergency management practitioners, and safety 
experts that would give the governor’s office, HECC, and legislature advice about gaps 
and needs for the IHE community, which they would assess by tracking the project’s 
progress and successes. The report notes that empowering the Council to guide these efforts 
would ensure traction, and therefore improve involvement of campus communities—
specifically the leaders.  
To ensure the Council has time to continue the oversight work, the Work Group 
recommended that one full-time employee be hired and embedded with an existing 
emergency management program.195 This statewide coordinator would be a shared-
services asset to all campuses and would have the ability to staff the Council with a 
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multidisciplinary team of stakeholders. Research supports that the closer the emergency 
manager is to the top of the organization, the more engagement, funding, and support the 
program will receive.196 Therefore, if the governor’s office is engaged with and prioritizes 
emergency management initiatives, presidents, provosts, chancellors, faculty, staff, and 
students are also more likely to be engaged with and prioritize emergency management 
initiatives. 
b. Statewide Training Model with Campus Community 
Preparedness is a shared responsibility for the entire campus, but preparedness 
programs will be lacking without engagement from the campus community, even if they 
have dedicated emergency managers. The Work Group identified lack of training as an 
issue for engagement, as it means the campus community is not prepared.197 Training 
requires staff and money; however, the Work Group’s solution for training with limited 
funding and resources was to leverage the resources that currently exist. The Work Group 
suggested that usable statewide training templates be made and shared with all 
postsecondary schools to ensure consistency and continuity across the state. Furthermore, 
engaging the campus community by recruiting students and faculty to create short training 
videos could garner engagement. The University of Oregon has previously shown that 
development of training documents and peer-to-peer trainings allows for more community 
participation in emergency management programs.198 Expanding this method for other 
emergency preparedness initiatives could be effective.  
c. All-Hazards Incident Management Team and Adoption of NIMAA 
As discussed in Section A of this chapter, the Work Group recommended that three 
to five campus-specific IMTs be supported throughout the state. The teams would be 
trained as Type III IMTs. This level of training mirrors state requirements, which means 
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IHE IMTs could train and build relationships with state IMTs. Additionally, coverage for 
the state could be provided as needed from university and college resources. This type of 
relationship building would be beneficial to both the academic institution and the 
community, as research shows that networks and relationships allow for a more 
coordinated response.199 The Work Group also recommended that all Oregon IHEs adopt 
the NIMAA program—this would build not only state-wide but also national 
relationships.200  
The Work Group’s method for engaging stakeholders will allow Oregon’s 
academic institutions to be connected to a large infrastructure of resources, information, 
and practitioners. Multiple studies link connectedness to improvement of trust, information 
flow, and resiliency.201 The more connectedness a person or institution has, the better the 
person’s or institution’s relationships and the more coordinated and consistent their 
responses to crises will be. Future studies of Oregon’s program should look specifically at 
the social networking of these mutual aid agreements to determine if IHEs across Oregon 
have more connections and serve as informational nodes to other institutions across the 
nation. 
3. Conclusion: Engagement Pros and Cons in the Oregon Model 
The reason campuses are not engaged is because there is no accountability for 
emergency management programming goals. To address this issue, the Work Group 
recommended oversight from the governor’s office. The measurement of success will be 
completed plans and trainings by the IHEs as reported through the Council to the governor, 
HECC, and legislative team. If engagement at the institutional level occurs quickly, there 
may not be a need for additional funding or resources, and current resources will be used 
before requests for additional state funds. Additionally, if solid relationships are built inside 
and outside the campus with all stakeholders, strategic plans and projects will be better 
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implemented. The Work Group’s report did not directly address behavioral issues, 
specificity of relationship building, or other engagement issues that could be found 
throughout the studies. However, programs such as IMT and NIMAA would allow for 
engagement based on psychological studies, as teams would need to train and work 
together frequently to ensure success. 
The extent of training and exercises was not discussed in the report; the report only 
that there would be an organized model to implement a training and exercise program. If 
implementation of training and exercises follows federal mandates, such as Clery, 
campuses will have only one drill or test annually, which may not be enough for true 
engagement. A statement of expectations surrounding training calendars, the number of 
trainings, and the types of trainings would be beneficial for measurements of this program 
moving forward. Additional studies on engagement in training and exercises after this 
program is implemented would be important to the emergency management field. Knowing 
how often training and exercises are conducted and if engagement improves because of 
them would be helpful information for other jurisdictions. 
Table 6 summarizes the pros and cons of the Oregon model in addressing the issues 
found throughout the literature. 
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Table 6.   The Oregon Model: Engagement  
Engagement 
Needs 
Issues Oregon Model Assessment 
Leadership 
engagement 















Reports status/progress of IHE 
emergency management program 
directly to governor’s office. 
+ Prioritizes the emergency management program within IHEs. 
– 
Does not show how leadership will add 
this additional prioritization to their 
already busy calendars. 
Statewide 
training model 
+ Will ensure standardized training for leadership team.  




Leadership do not have to be subject-
matter experts; trained IMT personnel 
will respond. 
– 
Leadership would need to be involved 
in mutual aid agreements, taking 



















+ Allows for interaction with IHE and 
state leadership on a regular basis, 
which builds rapport. 
– Could be dissolved if new state 
leadership is elected. 
Statewide 
training model 
+ Ensures a regular training program is 
conducted on campuses, allowing for 
visibility. 
+ Peer-to-peer trainings and curriculum 
designed by internal stakeholders 
emphasize engagement. 
– Does not specify how much training 
should be done each year.  
All-hazards IMT 
and NIMAA 
+ Ensures specified personnel from IHEs 
work and train together, enhancing 
engagement throughout the campuses.  
+ IMT will integrate into state IMT 
response, engaging external 
stakeholders.  
+ Involvement on a national level allows 
for engagement from campus 
stakeholders across the nation.  
– Does not lay out requirements for IMT 
teams or training recommendations for 




Issues Oregon Model Assessment 














– Does not address the nuances of 
transient population, adjunct faculty, or 




Peer-to-peer trainings and curriculum 
designed by internal stakeholders 
emphasize engagement. 
+ Would require ongoing training to account for transient population. 
– 
Does not address adjunct faculty 
engagement specifically. If adjunct 
faculty numbers continue to increase, 






May relieve some additional duty from 
faculty if trained IMT members are able 
to respond to campus. 
– 
Does not fully address the nuances of 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 71 
V. DISCUSSION 
Campuses, though similar to other institutions in the municipalities in which they 
reside, are distinct communities in their own right. Small and large crisis situations have 
affected universities and colleges and, as their own individual jurisdictions, they have been 
required to respond and recover, relying on their internal resources or mutual aid with 
stakeholders. As higher education budgets decrease and requirements for emergency 
preparedness continue to increase as a result of natural and man-made disasters, it is 
important for IHEs to examine how they can innovatively improve and sustain effective 
emergency management programs. Years of study and research have shown that IHEs have 
the same recurring issues despite lessons learned that have been shared across campus 
systems. The Oregon model may fix some of these ongoing issues by collectively 
networking a system of postsecondary institutions together in order to plan and train ahead 
of crises, and respond together if disaster occurs. This model of shared services, high-level 
visibility, and uniformity across the state has the potential to fill gaps identified in 
resources, planning, and engagement while maximizing resources among university and 
college campuses. This chapter summarizes the case study findings and discusses 
implementation barriers for states hoping to adopt similar models.  
A. OREGON SUMMARY 
Table 7 assembles the findings in each Oregon model area. The issues the Oregon 
model addresses span from staffing issues and rising tuition, to budget cuts and confusion 
with planning. Since the issues identified during the analysis are summarized at the end of 
each section in Chapter IV, they were not included in this table. The table outlines the 
Oregon model’s recommendations and assesses how they could alleviate the issues 
identified in previous research.  
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Shared services + Allows for cooperation, continuity, and communication between IHEs. 
+ Additional staff not necessary when resources are shared and existing resources are effectively used. 
+ Eliminates duplicative work. 
+ Saves money if IHEs do not need to fund an emergency manager at every 
institution. 
+ Saves money through shared resources. 
+ Allows for consistency across IHEs. 
+ Allows for consistency for plans using predesignated templates across IHEs. 
+ Builds plan blueprints and builds continuity. 
+ Eliminates duplicative work. 
– Model does not specifically address additional duties for EM, or the exact EM roles. 
– Requires ongoing funding to support. 
– 
Templates may follow guidance different from requirements of the city, 
county, and state (e.g., NFPA 1600 vs. NPG); this could still cause confusion 
when response is at a larger level.  
All-hazards 
IMT 
+ Fills staffing gap for crisis response. 
+ Trained personnel dedicated to IHEs able to help. 
+ Response is internal to IHEs, could be more cost effective than having a 
state IMT respond; also allows for shared resources. 
+ Knowledge of documentation of the response could allow for more accurate 
reimbursements. 
+ Allows for integration into city, county, and state response, building networks and mutual aid. 
+ Builds external stakeholders from other IHEs. 
+ Leadership will not have to be subject-matter experts; trained IMT personnel will respond. 
+ Ensures specified personnel from IHEs work and train together, enhancing 
engagement throughout the campuses.  
+ IMT will integrate into state IMT response, engaging external stakeholders.  
+ May relieve some additional duty from faculty if trained IMT members are able to respond to campus. 
– Time for training and response to other institutions. 
– Could be easily eliminated based on administrative agendas. 
– Cost associated with training and response to other institutions. 
– Does not lay out requirements for IMT teams or training recommendations 
for ongoing engagement.  
NIMAA + Allows for resource sharing across state lines. 
+ Builds mutual aid networks nationwide, maximizing resources for response, as needed. 





+ Involvement on a national level allows for engagement from campus 
stakeholders across the nation.  
– Not well defined for IHEs, and external stakeholders could remain inconsistent. 
– Leadership will need to be involved in mutual aid agreements, taking additional time.  
Full-time staff + Coincides with shared services and allows consistency at each institution. 
+ Direct tracking of progress and frequent reports to the governor for accountability. 
+ Maximizes resources by capitalizing on personnel and plans already in place. 
– Could be easily eliminated based on administrative agendas. 
– Ongoing cost associated with additional staff. 
– As a shared resource, would drive consistency across the state, building mutual aid continuity. 
– As a shared resource, would drive consistency across the state, building mutual aid continuity. 
Online resource 
directory 
+ Oregon-specific resource.  
+ Trained personnel dedicated to IHEs able to help. 
– Ongoing cost for implementation and upkeep. 







+ Reports status/progress of IHE emergency management program directly to governor’s office. 
+ Prioritizes the emergency management program within IHEs. 
+ Allows for interaction with IHE and state leadership on a regular basis, 
which builds rapport. 
– Does not show how leadership will add this additional prioritization to their already busy calendars. 
– Could be dissolved if new state leadership is elected. 
– Does not address the nuances of transient population, adjunct faculty, or 
additional duties.  
Statewide 
training model 
+ Ensures standardized training for leadership team.  
+ Allows for resource sharing across state lines. 
+ Ensures a regular training program is conducted on campuses, allowing for 
visibility. 
+ Peer-to-peer trainings and curriculum designed by internal stakeholders emphasize engagement. 
+ Requires ongoing training, continual training for transient population. 
– 
Does not address adjunct faculty engagement specifically. If adjunct faculty 
numbers continue to increase, their engagement will need to be directly 
addressed. 




The analysis shows that the Oregon model could provide solutions in a number of 
areas. The continuity, communication, and collaboration between universities and colleges 
across the state through shared services, an all-hazards IMT, statewide training, and online 
resource sharing will provide uniformity in planning, training, and response. The all-
hazards IMT will also align with the state IMT, opening the lines of communication and 
seamlessly tying IHEs into a state response. Frequent communication with the governor’s 
office, legislature, and campus presidents should bring visibility and accountability for 
emergency management in IHEs, also eliminating unknowns for the state’s leadership. 
Finally, collaboration through NIMAA with IHEs nationwide will provide additional 
stakeholders and support for the Oregon system. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
As the phases are implemented over the upcoming years, the staff will be able to 
identify challenges of the model. The following sections highlight potential 
implementation issues, which may be addressed as the Work Group begins to implement 
the program, but no sourced documents speak to the potential program gaps. Additionally, 
certain implicit challenges could occur as the phases are applied at the institutions. These 
elements will need to be addressed further as the program rolls out, or studied in further 
detail if they hinder progress.  
1. Funding 
As funding, on average, declines for higher education institutions, this model could 
provide a needed budget reprieve through shared services. This cost-savings initiative 
would provide more services with resources already in place. However, as noted in the 
analysis, this initiative requires upfront costs. Identifying the resources that are currently 
out there, organizing these resources in a systematic way, and ensuring consistency across 
the IHEs requires staff and ongoing funding. The Work Group identified an approximate 
cost of $500,000 for phase one of the program.202 This would include $167,00 for two full-
time employees—the Council coordinator and the training and resources coordinator—for 
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three years, $20,000–$50,000 for an online resource center, and funds to develop and 
implement resource and training materials and training program essentials. This equates to 
approximately $166,666 per year for the initial three years. The cost would have to be 
provided by the state, or each of the campuses would have to contribute $3,030 per year.  
Dividing the cost among the IHEs seems to be the most cost-effective way to 
implement these phases. A price tag of $3,030 per institution per year in return for a 
seamless and integrated emergency management program seems like an obvious choice; 
however, the cost of emergency management is often difficult to see on the front end. 
Disasters like the Virginia Tech shooting and Hurricane Katrina are seen as few-and-far-
between, if-only catastrophic events, such as Virginia Tech or Hurricane Katrina; however, 
emergency management programs in higher education address all hazards on campus. This 
can include water main breaks, elevator entrapments, campus protests, and proactive event 
planning (e.g., graduation). All campus events and crises can benefit from proactive 
emergency management programming. Additionally, the National Institute of Building 
Sciences conducted a study on hazard mitigation and determined that every dollar spent on 
actions to reduce disaster losses saves roughly four dollars in future benefits.203 Though 
this study was specific to FEMA and not higher education, the benefits of proactive 
planning and preparedness are similar. Nevertheless, marketing this program and having 
each campus fund a portion of it could be challenging if its benefits are not immediately 
tangible.  
2. IHE Landscape 
Accountability for growth in this model depends on state leadership, since the 
Higher Education Safety and Resilience Council will report program progress to the 
governor’s office and legislature. This could be detrimental for the program, depending on 
the climate of state administration and the constituents that elect these officials. Within a 
                                                 
203 Multihazard Mitigation Council, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to 
Assess the Future Savings from Mitigation Activities, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Building Sciences, 2005), iii, 5, https://www.floods.org/PDF/MMC_Volume1_FindingsConclusions 
Recommendations.pdf; “Multihazard Mitigation Council,” National Institute of Building Sciences, 
accessed July 27, 2018, https://www.nibs.org/page/mmc_projects#nhms. 
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few years, this program could collapse with administration change, particularly if the 
results and benefits of the program are not immediately identifiable. Funding through each 
individual university and college could eliminate some of this need. If the state’s leadership 
is not funding the program but is still profiting from the results—even in the long term—
the program has a better chance of survival. However, as shown in the literature and as 
evidenced by Oregon’s failed 2008 program, leadership engagement and buy-in are needed 
for a successful program.  
Leadership challenges also occur within the academic institutions. The Work 
Group report did not address the interpersonal rivalries or relationships within the various 
IHE types, nor did it discuss how challenges with leadership between entities can be 
overcome. In many states, public and private institutions are very different. Their funding 
streams, budget allocations, and programs in general differ from one another. This could 
pose a challenge as the program is implemented. If all institutions have pledged their 
support, clear lines about how the program will work for each institution will have to be 
outlined. For example, if one IHE has a dedicated emergency manager and another does 
not, will the shared services coordinator have to spend more time at the one without a full-
time employee? If that occurs, will other campuses feel left out and also want more of the 
coordinator’s time? How will shared funding be collected across the different budget lines 
and fairly distributed? If one IHE opts out of the program, will that institution be 
unsupported by other state IHEs when a disaster occurs? There are many questions and 
challenges that will need to be addressed as the model is phased in.  
Governance and geography for states that choose to implement the Oregon model 
could have unforeseen challenges, as structures, policies, processes, and relationships 
differ. Each state will have to look at the Oregon model’s benefits and determine what 
portions would work in their own jurisdiction. Cities—such as Kansas City, which spans 
the Kansas–Missouri border—may want to look into a regional consortium for the metro-
area colleges and universities. This system would bring a number of limitations due to state 
statutes, but could provide tremendous benefits for the resiliency of the city. States may 
find a statewide consortium too vast for initial implementation and could begin smaller 
consortiums with geographically clustered schools prior to statewide implementation.  
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3. Emergency Management Guidelines and Roles 
The Work Group report noted that training and policy requirements will use a 
combination of federal guidance documents, including the NFPA 1600, EMAP standard, 
and THIRA.204 However, these guidance documents, though supportive of incident 
command and NIMS, do not specifically parallel the NPG. If jurisdictions such as the 
county or city plan to support emergency functions or capabilities as the NPG outlines, 
there could still be confusion, from the IHE jurisdiction to the city, county, or state. These 
challenges can be mitigated through frequent internal–external stakeholder meetings and 
combined drills and exercises; however, this will require time and resources from all 
involved personnel. Change to the overall policy guidelines would need to occur at the 
federal level, with FEMA, the Department of Education, NFPA, EMAP, and other guiding 
stakeholders all coming together and building one integrated program in support of 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. This would be a massive undertaking at the 
federal level, which is why states and IHEs need to work closely together to better define 
how they will align in their own jurisdictions.  
Additionally, the Work Group report did not specifically address the emergency 
manager’s role. Emergency managers tend to wear multiple hats; although this model does 
not alleviate their workload, it could help, as plans and training models will be designed 
through the Council. Additional observation of the emergency manager’s role will be 
needed to determine if the program overburdens managers, or if the shared-services model 
lightens their load.  
4. Attaining Engagement  
Unengaged faculty, staff, students, and administrators who are busy with their day-
to-day jobs and not looking to become experts in emergency management may see a benefit 
to an organized, system-wide program. In a crisis situation, the campus would have to 
support itself, with the benefit of knowing that, within twenty-four hours, a trained 
response team made up of higher education personnel will be there to support their 
                                                 
204 University of Oregon, “Campus Safety,” 9. 
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response and recovery. However, believing that someone else will show up to resolve the 
incident could potentially cause greater gaps in engagement. This is why the model 
specifically addresses engagement through campus-wide training that relies on peer-to-
peer trainings and an involved campus community. All of this does take time—time away 
from studies, and time away from daily duties. As with the emergency manager’s role, 




Emergency managers have to do more than plan and respond for disasters; they 
need to think strategically about the future of higher education and emergency management 
needs as the world rapidly changes. Past case studies and lessons learned have offered 
historical narratives and helped IHEs understand why decisions were made, and what, at 
that point in time, was lacking. In the future, however, IHEs must look strategically at their 
preparedness programs and determine how they will be funded, supported, and continued 
as the requirements of homeland security become harder to meet and the funds for higher 
education decrease.  
IHEs can hope that resources will be available, that a crisis situation will not occur 
on their campus, and that funds are unlimited in times of disaster. But this head-in-the-sand 
outlook is the opposite of preparedness. Imagining a future in emergency management 
where everything is connected, planning is understood, and response is seamless provides 
a hopeful vision for what IHE programs could look like. Taking action to meet that vision 
must begin now, even if failure in certain areas occurs. IHEs must determine what works 
well and what does not so future emergency management programs can flourish.  
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
This research set out to discover what the recurring issues are in higher education 
emergency management programs and if the Oregon model could address them. Common 
issues from past studies and surveys fell into three categories: planning, resources, and 
engagement. Underlying causes for each category were then evaluated against the Oregon 
model. The true program outcomes will not be known until Oregon implements the 
program; however, this research asserts that the Oregon model will be successful in 
allowing uniformity across the state, ensuring continuity between institutions, and saving 
money in the long term. Challenges, including administration and emergency management 
confusion, could materialize as the program rolls out; however, if Oregon is able to pivot 
quickly when these roadblocks arise, the program shows potential of great success. If the 
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Oregon model proves successful and is applied nationally, our IHE system’s capacity and 
performance could contribute greatly to our nation’s resiliency. 
B. FUTURE STUDIES 
This initial study provides a baseline for a future examination of the Oregon model. 
Decision-makers will have tangible programs that work or do not work based on the 
outcome of the Oregon model. This case study can be used as a baseline for tracking 
changes with and gaps in the Oregon model, and could inform other states about how 
something similar may or may not work in their own region.  
This research offers a number of ideas for future studies, including:  
• Cost savings and investment: Since this program has not yet been 
implemented, there is no estimation of its cost savings. However, calculating 
cost savings would provide valuable information for future studies if research 
can show that the funds invested made IHEs more prepared despite spending 
fewer dollars on response. 
• Comparisons: As the program is implemented, data should be compared to see 
which initiatives worked and which did not. As other states implement similar 
programs, they can cherry-pick the most effective policy changes.   
• Outcomes: The Oregon model, after it is implemented, should be analyzed to 
see if recurring issues have improved or if the gaps found in this research have 
been resolved. This could substantiate or disprove this research, which would 
be important to understand. If current practices and studies are not improving 
emergency management programs, new innovations will need to be devised. 
• Assessment: This model offers a good baseline for future studies, pulling 
individual areas out for deeper analysis. As the program is implemented over 
a number of years, regular assessments in each area—resources, planning, and 
engagement—would be beneficial to evaluate what has worked and what 
has not. 
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C. THE CASE FOR CHANGE 
Oregon will be a model to watch and, as the program unfolds, other states can take 
what worked from Oregon and implement it in their own jurisdictions, leaving behind 
whatever portions of the Oregon model were not effective. Building programs off proven 
tactics will lead to a more robust IHE system and contribute to the overall resiliency of the 
nation.   
Universities or colleges with robust emergency management programs may look at 
the Oregon model and wonder, What’s in it for me? Resource-heavy campuses may end 
up offering more assistance to those who are lacking with this model; however, countless 
intangible benefits, such as good will, positive public relations, and knowing that the state 
or region will be more resilient when IHEs come together, are noble objectives. 
Additionally, when disaster hits those resource-heavy institutions, they too will need the 
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